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Abstract
This major research paper looks at how Canadian Supreme Court justices view their role
in adjudicating reference questions. Comparing the texts of 21 Supreme Court advisory
opinions across two eras of the Court (Chief Justice Laskin: 1973-1984 and Chief Justice
McLachlin: 2000-2017), the study examines the use of four narratives – the Guardian of
the Constitution, Umpire of Federalism, Institutional and Public Will – to determine how
the Court positions its role vis-à-vis the constitutional order and the other branches of
government. I use a mixed-method approach that incorporates an empirically oriented
content analysis of each decision, complemented by four in-depth case studies of
archetypal narrative displays. While evidence of all four narratives exists across both eras
of the Court, two – the Guardian of the Constitution and the Umpire of Federalism –
dominate both sets of judicial writings.
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Chapter 1
The Advisory Opinion
Increasingly, Canadians look to the judiciary, rather than the legislature for finality on
policy matters.1 While the Westminster parliamentary system dictates that the fusion of
powers embodied in the executive and legislature are the source of law and policy, the
rise of divisive partisanship, ideological decision-making and real-time transmission of
information from parliament to the public renders governments wary of developing
policies that might be viewed as controversial – particularly in close proximity to an
election. One of the ways governments have been able to seek out advice on such
difficult decisions is by having the courts rule on the legality or constitutionality of laws
(enacted or merely under consideration) and, if needed, return them to the legislature for
revision, “proofing” or insulating them – at least in part – from scrutiny. The mechanism
through which executives can do this is referred to as the advisory opinion.
At the federal level, the advisory opinion or reference question 2 is a function of the
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) Act, RSC 1985, though similar provisions exist for the
federal court and the provincial courts of appeal.3 The legislation that governs the
application of advisory opinions allows the Governor-in-Council (the executive, in a de
facto sense) in the appropriate jurisdiction to pose questions of legal-political importance
with the expectation that an advisory opinion will be handed down, guiding the
government in the legal and constitutional elements of the issue in question. For the

1

Angus Reid, “Canadians have a more favourable view of their Supreme Court than Americans have of
their own,” 17 August 2015. Available at: http://angusreid.org/supreme-court/.
2

I use the vocabulary of “reference question” to refer to that which is posed by the executive and “advisory
opinion” to refer to the response provided by the Court.
3

The Federal Court can hear questions related to federal boards, tribunals or commissions. All provinces
have built in similar provisions to their own judicature acts.

1

Supreme Court, this power emanates from section 53 of the Supreme Court Act4, which
reads,
53 (1) The Governor in Council may refer to the Court for hearing and consideration
important questions of law or fact concerning
(a) the interpretation of the Constitution Acts;
(b) the constitutionality or interpretation of any federal or provincial legislation;
(c) the appellate jurisdiction respecting educational matters, by the Constitution
Act, 1867, or by any other Act or law vested in the Governor in Council; or
(d) the powers of the Parliament of Canada, or of the legislatures of the provinces,
or of the respective governments thereof, whether or not the particular power in
question has been or is proposed to be exercised.5
The text of section 53 sets out the types of issues that may make up a question asked
under this section. Yet in truth, the four classes of questions almost cover the gamut of
political-legal questions: constitutional matters, legislative matters, federal matters and
institutional matters. Of course, many of these areas are covered in the course of routine
litigation. However, advisory decisions are unique as they deviate from courts’ traditional
caseloads in that they are not addressing a previous case or indeed even a “live” or
concrete legal problem in practice. Rather, courts are often asked to assess a legal
question in the abstract. In doing so, the courts rely on facts (though their interpretations
may be disputed) expert testimony (such as affidavits), submissions by counsel, evidence
(where applicable), case law and their own comprehension of the constitution or a
relevant piece of legislation under scrutiny.

4

Supreme Court Act (RSC, 1985, c. S-26).

5

Section 53(2) and (3) note that the executive may ask other questions that are deemed important, even if
they do not refer to constitutional matters.

2

Advisory opinions have typically been viewed as a strategic, political tool of the
executive. Only the federal government can ask questions directly to the Court (though
all provinces have built in similar provisions to their own judicature acts that permit them
to ask questions of their appeal courts and to appeal, by right, those decisions to the
Supreme Court). In the legal and political science literatures, most analysis of advisory
opinions consist of single case studies or the political-strategic use of the reference
question as a technique of blame avoidance or at least deferral of action on controversial
policy matters.6 Consequently, much has been said on their use for tactical, political
purposes.7 Such analyses tend to downplay the potential for the advisory opinion to serve
a laudable political purpose, namely an opportunity for government to engage with the
judiciary on matters of legality and constitutionality in advance of finalizing laws that
may benefit from careful legal scrutiny.
Regardless of the motivations of the executive, much less has been said about the Court’s
role in providing the opinion. In addition to its many uses for the executive, the advisory
opinion is also a mechanism through which the judiciary can make its legal opinions
known. In this view, both branches of government have the potential to be empowered by
the mechanism of the reference question, though it could also undoubtedly result in
conflict or fracture between the two branches.8 Such an opportunity presents a unique set
of considerations for the Court. They are, by tradition at least, somewhat compelled to
consider and advise on the issue under request and, since 1891, the “advisory only”
element of the decision has been treated as defunct, meaning that all decisions made by
the Court in advisory opinions are treated legally binding and treated as the final word on

6

See Kate Puddister, “Seeking the Court’s Advice: The Politics of the Canadian Reference Power”
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, forthcoming) for an extensive analysis of this politicalstrategic dimension.
7

For example: Peter W Hogg, and Allison A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue between Courts and
Legislatures, (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing after All)" Osgoode Hall LJ 35
(1997): 75; Peter H. Russell, The Court and the Constitution (Kingston ON: Institute of Intergovernmental
Relations, Queen's University, 1982); Puddister, supra note 6.
8

The scope of the courts’ and governments’ rights are set out in the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council’s re References by the Governor-General in Council, [1910] SCJ No. 33, 43 SCR 536, affd [1912]
AC 571 (PC) (also called “Re References”).

3

that legal issue, even if, according to the letter of the law, they are not.9 The Court also
maintains a good measure of discretion around how they choose to respond: they are not
forced to answer the questions as they are laid out, nor are they forced to provide a
palatable opinion to the executive who requests the opinion. This has the potential to
create conflict when the Court is asked to speculate on matters that should traditionally
fall within the scope of such questions that ought to be deliberated and presumably
answered by the legislature. In this way, it could be said that the reference question forces
the Court to breach the borders, if not act wholly outside, of its traditional bounds as a
legal arbiter and wade into the realm of policymaking.

1.1 Research Question
In the absence of a formal declaration by the Court about how they view their role in
rendering advisory opinions, we know little about the Court’s motivations or whether
they apply what I refer to as “a narrative framework” – or an overarching legal
understanding communicated in written form – for issuing advice to the executive
through this format. Even if such a statement did exist, we should entertain the notion
that there could be a fair amount of variance between individual judges and that some
evolution of this framework might take place over time as the composition and leadership
of the Court changes.
Yet, drawing from the considerable body of literature on the Supreme Court, we can
hypothesize that there are many ways that the Court could interpret its role in issuing
opinions: as an instrument of the public will; in terms of its relationship with the
executive and legislature (as one of three branches of government); as an arbiter of
federalism; or in its traditional role as the guardian of the constitution. There is, of course,
no need for the Court to locate solely in one space; rather, it is entirely possible that the
Court might view its role as multifaceted. Moreover, as the Court operates largely as a
composite body (though multiple viewpoints are often rendered in decisions), we should

9

Carissima Mathen, “"The question calls for an answer, and I propose to answer it": The Patriation
Reference as Constitutional Method” (2011) 54 The Supreme Court Law Review 143-166.
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account for the possibility that external factors such as large political punctuations (i.e.
the repatriation of the constitution, the entrenchment of a bill of rights or the passage of
institutional reform legislation), may cause the Court to change its evaluation framework
over time, much like the legislature and executive have evolved in the way they distribute
power and handle legislative matters.10 Indeed, we could also hypothesize that the
Court’s framework varies from decision to decision as different legal questions
encourage the Court to engage with different aspects of legal doctrine.
This study addresses some of the many questions that arise from these considerations. By
engaging in a comparative analysis of two eras of the Supreme Court – the Laskin Court
(1973 to 1984) and the McLachlin Court (2000 to 2017) – I seek to understand how
judges use the text of their advisory opinions to articulate a narrative framework for
decision-making. Subsequent to this broader analysis, I examine whether the introduction
of the Constitution Act, 1982 and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms created a pivot
point for way in which the Court issues advisory opinions. Thus, the examination of the
Laskin Court which issued 13 advisory opinions (see Appendix A for case listing),
including the pivotal Patriation Reference11, and sat up until the implementation of the
Charter in 1984, contrasted with the contemporary McLachlin Court’s 8 advisory
opinions (see Appendix A for case listing), provides an opportunity for an assessment of
these issues.12 Following this analysis, I engage in a case study of four of these
archetypal narrative frameworks in order to expand upon the understanding of the role of
the Court in advisory opinions.
Throughout my work, I find that the Court relies predominantly on two narrative
frameworks: the Guardian of the Constitution and Umpire of Federalism. In doing so,

10

For an analysis of this evolution, see Donald J. Savoie, Governing from the Centre: The concentration of
power in Canadian politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
11

Reference re Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753.

12

A total of 10 provincial references, requested of provincial superior courts, were also issued during
Laskin’s tenure as chief justice and 5 provincial references during McLachlin’s tenure. These references
were started and finished in provincial court and were not appealed to a higher court.

5

they firmly entrench the widely held belief in the legal scholarship and legal community
at large, that the Court views its role somewhat narrowly and endeavours to maintain a
relatively conservative approach to applying such narrative frameworks (which is not to
say that the actual outcomes of the decisions are conservative). However, at particular
moments of social and legal importance, the Court does engage in readings of the law
that reflect a Public Will or Institutional reading of legislation or the constitution as well.

6

Chapter 1
The Reference Power – Uses, Abuses and Legal Utility
The existence of the advisory opinion mechanism is somewhat unique to Canada.
Although the Supreme Court Act draws the reference feature through emulation of British
common law, the UK’s reference power is unused in present day. Courts in other
common law jurisdictions such as New Zealand, Australia and the United States have not
been empowered to issue advisory opinions (though some individual states do permit
questions asked by the state legislature or the governor).13 Civil law jurisdictions do have
similar mechanisms in place to advise governments on constitutional matters,14 however,
none has the executive-centered approach featured in Canada, which places reference
questions as the sole prerogative of the executive via the Governor-in-Council (or
Lieutenant Governor-in-Council for provincial references).15 The Canada-as-a-legaloutlier motivation alone makes the act of studying advisory opinions an interesting one.
However, the within-case contrast of how each institution views the advisory opinion is
equally useful to position the Court’s role in applying this mechanism for constitutional
and legal study.
Since the introduction of the Supreme Court Act in 1875, the Court as the final court of
appeal for Canada, its predecessor, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC),
and its provincial counterparts have produced over 200 advisory opinions for their
respective executives. The content of questions has ranged in subject matter from

13

From Puddister, supra note 6 at 10: “The state constitutions of Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and South Dakota authorize advisory opinions, while, Alabama
and Delaware provide the advisory power through statute”.
14

Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000).
15

Puddister, supra note 6.
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agricultural or resource policy16, “New Deal”-era social policy17 to institutional reform18.
While many have had implications across multiple areas of law, most (if not all) have
focused on questions of constitutional importance.
Many scholars have opined on the reasons why executives would call upon the judiciary
to answer constitutional or policy-oriented questions through the mechanism of the
advisory opinion. It has been the interest of many scholars to point to the strategic
elements of the reference power, sometimes characterised as the abuses of the availability
of the reference question. The JCPC itself recognized the potential for this abuse early on,
citing “mischief and inconvenience […] might arise from an indiscriminate and
injudicious use of the Act”.19 Smith observes its historical use was largely as an
alternative or replacement for the disallowance power, permitting federal governments to
have the Court invalidate provincial legislation without having to do so directly. 20 Many
constitutional scholars point out a more evolved inter-government or federalism
dimension of the reference question, namely that it serves as a “practical device [for
governments] to police the constitutional excesses of the other”, while also noting its
power to be used as a political weapon in inter-governmental sparring.21 The 1984
Reference re Newfoundland Continental Shelf22 points to such an occasion. The federal
government used their reference power to ask the Supreme Court about the
constitutionality of off-shore natural resource exploration before the provincial court

16

Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing, [1978] 2 SCR 1198; Reference re Newfoundland
Continental Shelf, [1984] 1 SCR 86
17

AG BC v. AG Cda [1937] AC 377 III Olmsted 228; AG Cda v. AG Ontario [1937] AC 326.

18

Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32; Reference re Supreme Court Act ss. 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21,
[2014] 1 SCR 433
19

Reference, supra note 8 at para16.

20

Jennifer Smith, “The Origins of Judicial Review in Canada” (1983) 16 Canadian Journal of Political
Science 1: 115–134.
21

Barry Strayer, “Constitutional References” in F. L. Morton, Law, politics, and the judicial process in
Canada (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2002) at 262; Russell, supra note 7 at 7.
22

Reference re Newfoundland Continental Shelf [1984] 1 SCR 86.
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could return their own answer. As the SCC ruled in favour of the government, the federal
government effectively stemmed the provinces rights and upended the provincial court’s
decision.
Puddister, reviewing the political science literature, neatly categorizes the executive’s
choice to submit a reference questions as stemming from one of five motivations: to
avoid decision-making particularly in controversial policy areas (a delegation
motivation), to protect jurisdiction (an inter-governmental conflict resolution function), to
determine constitutionality of a policy (a proofing function), to benefit from institutional
authority of the courts (a legitimation function), and to address pressing issues in a timely
manner to allow for some amount of control in framing the policy debate (a strategic
agenda-management function).23 These functions are corroborated in many analyses of
individual reference cases24, some of which point to the volatility introduced into the
system by reference questions. For example, Strayer notes that the executive’s relative
freedom to be able to ask for advisory opinions threatens to erode the independence and
authority of the courts.25 While others (including the Court itself) have taken the view
that the Court’s ability to decline to answer certain questions protects it from such abuses,
the potential for politicization of the advisory opinion remains one of its more
controversial elements.
Yet, reference decisions are neither a purely instrumental device to clarify the bounds of
Canada’s political institutions, nor are they solely used to obtain advantages in intergovernmental relations. Many reference decisions speak to a wide variety of
constitutional matters that have profound implications for the lives of Canadians, ranging

23

Puddister, supra note 6 at 14.

24

See Lori Hausegger, Troy Riddell, and Matthew Hennigar, Canadian Courts: Law, Politics, and
Process, 2nd ed. (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2015); Carissima Mathen, “Mutability and Method
in the Marriage Reference” (2005) 54 UNBLJ at 43; Kate Glover, “The Supreme Court in a Pluralistic
World: Four Readings of a Reference” (2015) 60 McGill LJ 4 at: 839.
25

Strayer, supra note 21 at 262.
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from their freedom to marry, to the status of their citizenship within the country.26 The
advisory opinion has particular purchase in issues of constitutional reform and
institutional change with fully one quarter of all final appellate court decisions involving
constitutional law stemming from references.27
While scholars point to the more strategic elements of the government’s ability to ask
reference questions, the mechanism itself may also have more laudable uses. References
can be used as an opportunity to test the legality of policy goals and initiatives.28
Emergency conditions make it imperative that government can be assured of the validity
of a proposed action.29 The Court may also be used to provide legal advice on a
parliamentary issue that is largely non-justiciable. Advisory opinions can confirm
jurisdiction, can bring levels of government together in deliberation and discussion
outside of the usual forum of the First Ministers Meetings.30 The outcomes of advisory
opinion may produce uniformity in standards across the country, as all governments will
have had the benefit of hearing the Court’s deliberation on the issue. It may also have the
benefit of preventing further litigation in areas of constitutional opaqueness.
Certainly these advantages can largely be viewed as the other side of the strategic
motivation coin. But it is also imperative to note that the federal government gives up
some of its authority when deferring a question to the Court. Certainly, governments are
able to frame questions as they wish; however, doing so always introduces an element of
risk of having their position declined or ruled unconstitutional. Glover, for example,
notes that once reference questions are submitted to the Court, governments lose control

26

Re Same-Sex Marriage [2004] 3 SCR 698; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217.

27

Strayer, supra note 21 at 261.

28

Glover, supra note 24.

29

Strayer, supra note 21 at 267.

30

When a reference is before the Court, all governments are notified and requests to serve as interveners
are automatically accepted
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over the process, arguments and outcome.31 As evident in the Harper government’s
experiences with the Supreme Court Act Reference and Senate Reference, such gambles
can have political consequences that may stymie or frustrate federal objectives.
Regardless of the focus on the relative positives or negatives of the use of the reference
question as a political tool, this executive-centred discourse has been the dominant
narrative in explaining the use of the reference question. Far less has been said about the
Court’s position in producing advisory opinions. I endeavour to fill that gap.

2.1 A Singular Mechanism
The Court has traditionally used the practice of delivering written decisions not only as a
means to convey their ruling on a particular fact set, but also to communicate broader
constitutional or legal principles to be applied by the legal community going forward.
Most famously, in Edwards v Canada (AG), A.C. 124, 1929 UKPC 86, Justice Sankey’s
communication of the “living tree capable of growth” principle that encourages courts to
give the constitution a “large and liberal interpretation” has resonated with future Courts
and been applied expeditiously in cases ranging from institutional reform to freedom of
expression. This may be particularly true in their deliberation and delivery of decisions in
advisory opinions precisely because these are opportunities for the Court to engage in
conversation with the executive directly on issues of legal-political importance.
While it is possible the Court does not see their role in references any differently than
they view their role in routine litigation, the effect of their writings in response to
reference questions may not only provide clarity on particular legal questions, it might
also afford a legal audience a view of the Court’s broader understanding of an issue. Of
course, this is not necessarily different than the clarity afforded through the Court’s
regular jurisprudence; however, In short, the Court’s writings are a trove of information
about the broader frameworks that they use to come to more particularized decisions.

31

Kate Glover Berger, “The Impact of Constitutional References on Institutional Reform” in Emmett
Macfarlane (ed), Policy Change, Courts, and the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2018) at 126.

11

The availability of these decisions is longstanding, but with an important caveat. Prior to
1891, the SCC did not write up accompanying reasoning for the decisions it made with
respect to reference questions. Amendments to the Supreme Court Act made in 1891
allowed interested parties to submit oral and written arguments and have the Court hand
down a written opinion.32 This change in procedure has yielded information, not only on
outcomes, but process. Since provinces then gave themselves their own reference power
through their appeal courts in the decade following the 1891 reforms, a tremendous
volume of text is available to consider the opinions of courts as it relates to the provision
of advisory opinions.
These texts permit a number of forms of analysis. Most readily, observers of the Court’s
decisions can glean from them a considerable amount of information with respect to their
views on legal questions. As noted above, the Court has used the occasion of providing
an advisory opinion to reflect on the nature of these opinions, their breadth and limits, as
well as their utility with in the broader framework of Canadian jurisprudence. Yet, legalpolitical and institutional conflict can also arise from advisory opinions as they may place
limits on other branches or orders of government. In posing reference questions, the
executive has challenged their legitimacy and legality more than once. In one decidedly
meta-constitutional reference, the Re References by the Governor-General in Council,
[1910] 43 S.C.R. 536, or the so-called “References Reference”33, the JCPC was asked to
adjudicate whether the reference power of the executive was within the legislative
jurisdiction of Parliament.34 Though it recognized that, in providing the advisory opinion,
the Court was essentially engaging in an extrajudicial function (potentially compromising

32

Strayer, supra note 21 at 261.

33

Reference, supra note 8. Interestingly, the JCPC ruled that, although answering references was a “nonjudicial function”, it could nonetheless be imposed on the court by statute. This reflects the prevailing
notion at the time of the SCA, 1875 was merely statute, and not, as it is considered now, quasiconstitutional legislation.
34

The question was framed as “whether under the Canadian Constitution the Governor-General in Council
has power to frame and refer to the Supreme Court questions as to the constitutional powers of the
Provinces as to the effect of Provincial statutes and as to the interests of individuals who may be
unrepresented upon such reference and to require the Supreme Court to answer such questions.” Reference,
supra note 8 at 2.
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its independence), it clarified that it was permitted to do so because the opinions are
solely advisory and not legally binding.35 The Court was called upon for this sort of selfreflection again in the Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court
(P.E.I.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, wherein the Court was, in effect, asked to comment on its
own independence as well as core functions of the judiciary. 36 Similarly, in the Senate
Reform Reference, the Court further outlined its “proper role”, that of determining “the
legal framework for implementing the specific changes”, rather than the desirability of
such changes.37 The Court’s ruling in the Supreme Court Act Reference is another clear
example of the Court weighing in on its own independence and status within the
constitutional order.
The executive has pushed back on the legitimacy of the advisory opinion in further
cases.38 In the Reference re Canada Assistant Plan (BC) [1991] 2 SCR 525, the Court
asserted limits around the requirement to answer reference questions, stating that it could
decline to answer a reference question where it would take the court beyond “its proper
role within the constitutional framework of our democratic form of government”. 39 In the
Secession Reference40, the Court revisited this issue and addressed the critique that the
advisory opinion fell outside routine judicial function41. In their decision, the Court

35

Advisory opinions, though not binding, are cited in case law as would any other legal precedent. Thus,
they take on, in many ways, the characteristics of binding decisions. Strayer, supra note 21 at 261 notes that
they are “Technically not binding, but still authoritative”.
36

Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism Or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2016) at 157.
37

Reference, supra note 18 at para 4.

38

However, looking at the disposition of the Court in reference cases, Puddister, supra note 6, finds that
only in 21% of cases was government law invalidated (Invalid in part 16%; Valid 46%; N/A 17%).
39

Florian Sauvageau, David Schneiderman, and David Taras, Last Word: Media Coverage of the Supreme
Court of Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011) at 125; Reference re Canada
Assistant Plan (BC) [1991] 2 SCR 525 at 545.
40

Reference, supra note 26.

41

The Amicus Curiae for Quebec questioned the function of the Court’s advisory power as follows:
“[e]ither this constitutional power [to give the highest court in the federation jurisdiction to give advisory
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clearly articulated that, while the reference power might not be expressly enumerated
within either of Canada’s constitutions, “there is no constitutional bar to this Court's
receipt of jurisdiction to undertake such an advisory role”.42 They also used the
opportunity to clarify that it would not be compelled to answer questions put to it by
government that were “outside the court’s expertise, the interpretation of the law, broadly
construed”.43 In essence, the Court has been able to use the very mechanism that contains
an attack in its own defence – suggesting that the advisory opinion is truly a unique
political tool.
The Court has also used the advisory opinion to provide clarity on legal matters that had
not been (or could not be) brought to the Court through tradition litigation. For example,
in the Patriation Reference, the Court made a statement about the use of conventions and
remedy for their violation. In looking at the justiciability dimension of the convention
question, which, though not a matter of law according to justices Estey, Laskin and
McIntyre, one that they would take up owing to in the Patriation Reference because of the
“unusual nature of these References”.44 This comment clearly reflects the fact that
advisory opinions, while part of the broader set of case law, hold a special place in this
body precisely because they are a type of executive-judicial engagement that permits a
wider set of legal issues to be adjudicated. The practical outcome is that the Court’s
decision elevated conventions from a mere political nicety to a quasi-justiciable element
within constitutional law.
Similarly, the Court has used the mechanism of advisory opinions to make statements
writ large on the nature of constitutional law in Canada with profound effects for political

opinions] is expressly provided for by the Constitution, as is the case in India (Constitution of India, art.
143), or it is not provided for therein and so it simply does not exist. (Emphasis in original).
42

Reference, supra note 26 at para 15.

43

Reference, supra note 26 at para 26.

44

Reference, supra note 11 at 849.
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actors and institutions. Glover notes that in the Senate Reference, the Court used theories
of unwritten constitutional law and precedent to conclude that the constitution has an
internal architecture (upholding and expanding upon their statement in OPSEU45),
thereby limiting the legislature’s unilateral ability to tinker with institutional structure. 46
From a theoretical perspective, the decision filled many textual gaps in constitutional law
that were exposed in the writing of the 1982 Constitution Act47. However, from a
practical perspective, the Court used the reference decision to reinforce norms about
inter-governmental relations set out in early decisions.48
In all of the above decisions, the Court has used the process of deliberation and creation
of a written advisory opinion to make a series of (largely) inter-connected statements
about constitutional law with profound effects for the practice of politics in Canada. As
noted by Mathen, in each decision, “the Court appears to be performing the same
function: identifying broad principles and applying them to produce a particular legal
rule”.49 Of course, the Court does not have to wait for a reference question to be asked to
make such declarations (they could do so in routine case law), but the advisory opinion
offers the Court a few opportunities that are unique to the mechanism: (1) to respond to
constitutional questions more broadly than is usually done in routine litigation; (2) to
directly engage with the executive on matters of legal-political importance; (3) to
selectively answer questions (and in doing so, make implicit statements about the
appropriateness of the tool’s use or the question at hand)50; and, (4) to expand on the
scope of questions asked with far-ranging implications for core elements of the Canadian
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Glover, supra note 24 at 845.
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Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
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Reference, supra note 11; Re: Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1982] 2
SCR 793.
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Mathen, supra note 9 at 150.
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Evidence of this can be found in the refusal to answer such in Re Goods and Services Tax [1992] 2 SCR
445 and Reference, supra note 26.
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political structure. This singular mechanism provides ample scope for the study of not
only constitutional law, but also judicial behaviour. It is to this issue that I now turn.

2.2 A Framework for Advice: Assessing Judges’ Role in
Advisory Decisions
Across the aforementioned decisions and the myriad other reference questions that have
been asked of the Court, we can see preliminary evidence of the Court commenting on its
role in the advisory capacity and setting out norms for judicial behaviour. For example, in
the Secession Reference, the Court asserts, “The very fact that the Court may be asked
hypothetical questions in a reference, such as the constitutionality of proposed legislation,
engages the Court in an exercise it would never entertain in the context of litigation”. 51 In
doing so, the courts puts limitations around how far its advisory capacity goes and
suggests that the prevailing norm of judicial behaviour, in the aggregate, is to impose
self-restraint in its position of constitutional advisor. There are a number of implications
that arise from this statement. First, the courts tend not to comment on matters that are
currently under review by the courts or in another jurisdiction. To do so would be to
interfere with a lower court’s jurisdiction or would jeopardize ongoing hearings. Second,
broader comments on constitutionality, as related to the legal framework or constitutional
architecture are well within the courts’ purview and the courts may address some of these
in an opinion even if it is not within the narrow question asked by the Governor-inCouncil. The Court’s pronouncement on constitutional architecture embedded in the
Senate Reference might be an example of this. Third, advisory opinions are (presumably)
part of a broader dialogue between the executive and the judiciary. Though the legislature
rarely does pose a question to the Court, they are permitted to do so under section 54 of
the Supreme Court Act (1875), and they are certainly implicated in the outcomes of
advisory opinions in their legislative work. A fourth mechanism may also be at play in
the mechanical structure of the advisory opinion. That the federal government has the
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Reference, supra note 26.
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agenda setting power to ask questions of the Court, and provincial governments of their
Courts of Appeal, suggests that reference questions can also be used in opposition to one
another as an instrument of intergovernmental relations. In sum, there are at least four
mechanisms at play here: (1) protecting the rule of law; (2) addressing questions of
constitutionality; (3) institutional relations; and (4) “umpiring” federalism.52
Though the presumed implication of an advisory opinion is largely a legal matter,
reference questions and the advisory opinions that are rendered in response are not
immune from political influence. As noted above, the questions themselves may have
political or strategic value. Thus, this research endeavour focuses on the narratives that
the Court creates and how these have evolved over time. As Glover notes, externally
applied narratives have surrounded the Court since its inception. 53 These include the
“evolving Court”, which grew from a secondary court to the highest judicial body in the
land with elevated power post-Charter, as well as the Court as a powerful actor/check on
government/sometimes-policymaker.54 Such narratives socially construct a role for the
Court from the outside. However, the Court goes a long way to contribute to the
narratives through the discourses about constitutional law, political institutions and
federalism that it creates inside of its own decisions.
The above examination of the political and legal dimensions of the advisory opinion
points to a testable proposition about the presence of and relative weight of internallyconstructed narratives emanating from the Court’s advisory opinions. The observations
above suggest four way(s) in which the Court may narrate its role vis-à-vis reference
questions:
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Gerald Baier, "The EU's Constitutional Treaty: Federalism and intergovernmental relations–lessons from
Canada” (2005) 15 Regional and Federal Studies 2: 205-223.
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Glover, supra note 24.
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(1) In issuing advisory opinions, the Supreme Court contributes to a narrative of
deference to the authority of the executive in law/policymaking matters (the
Institutional role);
(2) In issuing advisory opinions, the Supreme Court contributes to a narrative of
limiting the authority of the executive to act unilaterally, instead promoting some
conception of what the public wants or the current temperature of society (broadly
speaking) on a particular social issue (the Public Will role);
(3) In issuing advisory opinions, the Supreme Court contributes to a narrative of
itself as the protector of constitutional architecture (the Guardian of the
Constitution role 55);
(4) In issuing advisory opinions, the Supreme Court contributes to a narrative of
itself as an arbiter of intergovernmental relations (the Umpire of Federalism role).
Of course, these four narratives may be interdependent and could be at play in varying
combinations to varying degrees, depending on the question(s) at hand. As Glover notes,
these metaphors are relational – they suggest the nature of relationships between actors.56
It may also be the case that some advisory opinions contain none of these narratives.
However, understanding the presence and volume of these narratives and how the Court
has applied them over time (particularly before and after critical junctures such as the
introduction of the Charter) provide legal scholars a basis upon which they can build
over-time analyses of the Court’s behaviours with respect to constitutional law and
judicial-executive relations. The importance of understanding the decision-making
processes that courts undertake when responding to a reference question is central to
understanding legal and political processes (i.e. how government works), and the legality
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Glover, supra note 24 at 850.
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of political outcomes that have implications for the relationships between governments,
constitutional architecture and public policy matters.
On the process side, the advisory opinion is a clear example of the tensions that exist
within intergovernmental relationships. It reflects the necessary connection between the
branches of government – in this case the judiciary and an executive whose power
emanated from its position within the legislative branch. In this sense, the significance of
asking how judges view their role is directly connected to the extent of their authority in
providing legal advice to the executive branch. This rather benign statement carries with
it considerable implications for the way that legal scholars have traditionally understood
the bounds of the judiciary’s authority. Legal scholarship has demonstrated a wide
variety of opinions as to how much the courts should weigh in on matters of public policy
that, according to a strict constitutional interpretation, ought to fall solely within the
legislative purview of the legislature and executive.57
This may prompt the question of whether the provision of advisory opinions constitutes
one of the Court’s essential features. As defined in the Supreme Court Act Reference
(2015), the essential features of the Court, which are protected from simple statutory
change under s. 42(1)(d), include the Court’s composition, its jurisdiction as the final
court of appeal on matters of constitutional interpretation (and other legal matters) and its
independence from government. Although the decision notes that the entirety of the
Supreme Court Act is not necessarily covered by the protections to its framework
governed by Part V of the Constitution Act of 198258, it is possible that, by reflecting on
the Court’s adjudication of its role in the context of the reference opinions, we may find
evidence that it is plausibly protected as such.
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The burden has repeatedly fallen to the courts to adjudicate such matters. While those
committed to a firm line between the courts and the legislature in terms of policymaking
might argue that the courts should not accept reference questions to prevent them from
having to engage in matters beyond the scope of their judicial duties, a critic might point
to the legislative point of origin (the SCA) which has subsequently taken on constitutional
status. Therefore, understanding the courts’ view on the scope of their duties in hearing
debates and issuing advisory opinions is necessary to understanding how the court sees
the scope of its power, and how, if at all, this has changed over time.
Finally, this question also further engages with the literature on judicial behaviour.59
Judges are perceived to be rational actors, and even though their positions call for
independence from the political process, a lifetime of judicial decisions often renders
evident certain views of how political processes ought to be or how the law ought to
function. This implicitly normative element, even when suppressed by a textualist read of
law or the constitution, highlights that judges, like everyone else, have political and
ideological views that underscore their decision-making. Part of this concern, and others
listed above, is dealt with in the references themselves. The 1910 reference Re
References60, adjudicated by the JCPC, states that references are not a threat to the
separation of the powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of
government. It also gave further discretion to the courts to decide appropriate use of the
reference power by the executive, thereby implying that (to some extent, at least), just as
the Court has control of its docket, so does it have control over what reference cases it
hears.61
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Chapter 2
Methodology
At first glance, it may be logical to think that the problem above is a relatively
straightforward question that could best be solved by carefully interrogating the texts of
the advisory opinions and inferring based on the results. Yet, such an approach would
necessarily leave out the many policy implications or strategic considerations by other
relevant actors (namely, the federal government and governments in other jurisdictions,
as well as the legal and (often) corporate communities that are the subjects of these
references). If we are to acknowledge that agency is relevant in this discussion, then
examples of attitudinal models of judicial behaviour are relevant here. 62 It would also be
sensible to acknowledge the potential for the Court’s role to shift over time, thus
prompting an inherent temporal comparative element to the research at hand. Thus, the
question evokes elements of doctrinal, empirical and comparative methodological
approaches, each offering a different way to triangulate the Courts’ view of their role.
We may think of this question as lending itself quite nicely to a mixed methods approach.
While mixed methods approaches are not mainstream within legal analysis at present,
their adoption in other fields within the social and behavioural sciences suggests they
might have purchase in the analysis of legal questions as well. Mixed methods emerge
from a positivist tradition and seek to employ a combination of quantitative and
qualitative methodological techniques to better triangulate outcomes of interest.63
Similarly, multi-method approaches use multiple methodological techniques within the
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same quantitative or qualitative tradition.64 The advantage of mixed- or multi-method
designs (and methodological pluralism in general) is not only that it permits a more
robust assessment of a research question, but also in its ability to bridge methodological
divides between researchers, promoting greater acceptance of scholarship across subdisciplines.
To answer the questions I have set out above, I will provide a summary analysis of all
reference cases across the two time periods of interest. The summary analysis will
include differentiation of the cases using broad empirical indicators such as structure of
the decision (unanimous, number of opinions/dissents) and presence or absence (and
degree) of any of the relevant conceptions of the SCC’s role. This empirical analysis will
also include the results of an in-depth manual coding exercise where the text of the
opinions is coded for the presence of the four narratives on a per-sentence basis to permit
some broader observations to be drawn from the larger corpus of text under investigation
(see below for further information). The second part of the analysis will be more
qualitatively focused and feature a case study of four decisions (two from the Laskin
Court and two from the McLachlin Court) that typify some of the patterns observed in the
quantitative analysis. Although the selection of four cases will necessarily exclude some
of the empirical richness that can be observed in the other available cases, they will be
presented in a manner that reflects upon which trends are representative of the court’s
broader stance on the issues at the time and which are unique to the case study under
observation.
Thus, I take a mixed-methodological approach that integrates three different positivist
epistemological approaches: a doctrinal approach, an empirical approach and a cross-case
comparative approach. Each is discussed briefly below.
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3.1 Doctrinal Approach
First, I used a case-driven method – doctrinal analysis of the advisory opinions
themselves. Where possible, I supplement this analysis with secondary sources. The
doctrinal method, as noted by Morris and Murphy focuses “almost entirely on the law’s
own language of statutes and case law to make sense of the legal world”.65 In other
words, it does not concern itself with the policy implications (except to the extent that
policy is related to the analysis of the law) of the reference questions (though this is a
useful, if separate, area for further analysis). Doctrinal analysis does, however, enable a
study of the principles of the law that undergird the inclusions of the reference decision
as a mechanism for constitutional clarification in the Supreme Court Act (1875). Thus,
statutory interpretation plays an integral role in this study. In analysing the intentions set
out by the framers of the Act and comparing those with the contents of the reference
cases, I can investigate how the Court’s role has evolved with respect to how it addresses
advisory opinions and what the original intent of the Act suggests it ought to have been.66
This deductive doctrinal analysis provides the contextual reading required to make
assertions about what the scope of the court’s role according to legislation baseline for
measuring what it has become over time.

3.2 Empirical Approach
Second, I take an empirical approach in examining the content of the reference cases
using a content analytical method. A considerable effort has been devoted to attitudinal or
behavioural studies of judicial behaviour that look at judicial decisions and infer judges’
motivations from their writings.67 Indeed, this is both a useful and practical

65
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methodological exercise as the judges declare openly their process of deliberation and
their reasoning for coming to the decision. From a practical perspective, the public
availability of these often-lengthy decisions provides scholars with ample material to
study using a content analysis approach. Such approaches are not often used, but are also
not completely novel in legal research. Work by Slotnick and Sauvageau, Schneiderman
and Taras illustrate the utility of content analysis approaches in looking at media
coverage of the US and Canadian Supreme Court.68 More broadly, Krippendorf
recognizes the utility of applying content analysis across all areas of the humanities and
social science, as they permit systematic analysis of text for both manifest (i.e. surfacelevel) and latent (i.e. meaning intensive) content.69
This portion takes on both an inductive and deductive element. The deductive approach is
evident in the process of setting out a series of indicators that are reflective of the
concepts specified in my hypothesis. The inductive element is reflective of the fact that
the coding process is somewhat iterative. While the coding process may be automated,
the process of manual verification of the application of the coding permits the researcher
to continuously refine the coding to enhance validity and reliability of the measures.
These objective-style70 indicators are then used to code the cases for the presence or
absence of my four motivations interest. One the coding is complete, I apply the analysis
comparatively across the two Chief Justice’s Courts by analyzing the frequencies of my
four hypothesized expectations. A coding framework and elaboration on the technique
can be found in Appendix B.
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3.3 Comparative Approach
Finally, the added element of the Laskin/McLachlin Court comparison necessitates a
comparative research design. Unlike traditional cross-national comparisons, this study
takes on a within-case comparison across time.71 This sort of within-case study stems
some of the critiques often levelled at comparative work – namely, that it does not allow
in-depth analysis of the legal contexts across comparators. Within-case analysis, such as
that of Judith Resnick on the comparison across three US Supreme Court Chief Justices
provides a useful model for examining the institutional and jurisprudential developments
that occur under different judicial leadership.72 Of course, the over-time analysis adds a
historical dimension to the paper; however, I am cautious about characterising this
analysis as historical in terms of its methodology. While the analysis recognizes the
implicit historical dimension and context under which each Court laboured, it does not
specifically treat historical era as an independent variable that could affect outcome.
This tri-partite method is well suited to answer the overarching research question as it
robustly addresses three different areas of analysis for the question. It takes on the careful
legal text-based analysis through the doctrinal aspect. It provides an analytical approach
through the collection and analysis of quantitative data. And finally, it recognized the
implicit dimension of change and continuity that exists across courts by comparing two
different time periods – particularly one that represents a potential pivot point in the way
the court addresses issues of constitutional importance through references.
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Chapter 3
Results
An examination of the secondary literature in this area suggests that we should expect
some degree of adhesion to each of the five hypotheses set out above. Indeed, work by
Mathen73, Puddister74, and Glover75 has suggested that the reference power is not only a
useful tool for the executive to escape the pressures of some of the more controversial
questions, but it also represents a venue for the courts to engage in the protection of
constitution, the maintenance of the federal system and the delineation of the executive’s
policymaking boundaries, and their ability to wade into contemporary social-political
issues. The following analysis determines to what degree each of these themes or
narratives (these terms are used interchangeably) exist in the two sets of advisory
opinions.
The results section proceeds as follows: I begin with some general observations about the
structure of the advisory opinion cases across the Laskin and McLachlin eras. This
includes some cursory observations about the origin of the cases, the structure of the
response from the Court (i.e. per curiam, unanimous, split decisions, etc.), the subject
matter of the cases and the general thematic disposition or narrative contained in the
decision. Following these observations, I engage in a comparative analysis of the
dominant trends of the Laskin Court and the McLachlin Court. Given the quantitative,
tabular thrust of this analysis, it is necessarily based on objective indicators (e.g. how
many mentions of a particular narrative are in a given case?), rather than in-depth
analysis of any one theme or case. However, this aggregate analysis alone may lack the
descriptive richness of case-based study as is found in analyses of specific references.76
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Therefore, after concluding the empirical section of the comparative analysis, I engage in
a qualitative analysis of four cases that typify the dominant narratives discussed in the
earlier portion of this study. This portion of the analysis allows me to draw out some of
the themes in greater depth than is permitted by the empirical analysis alone.

4.1 Advisory Opinions in Two Eras: Structure and Trends
Beginning with some cursory observations about the nature of the advisory opinions in
the Laskin era (1973-1984) and the McLachlin era (2000-2017), one immediately notes
that Laskin served as a Chief Justice for a comparatively “short” 11 years, compared with
McLachlin’s 18. Yet, the length of the eras appears to have no discernible impact on the
trends of how many or what type of reference questions was asked of the Courts. Each
Court’s decisions, their origins, the structure of the Court’s response, case type and
dominant theme or characteristic are catalogued in Tables 1 and 2. The Laskin Court
provided a total of 13 advisory opinions. Three of these were questions asked directly by
the Governor-in-Council, while the remaining 10 were cases on appeal from the
provinces (2 from Ontario, 2 from Newfoundland, 2 from Alberta, 1 from New
Brunswick, 1 from British Columbia, 1 from Quebec and 1 – the Resolution to Amend the
Constitution Reference – from Manitoba, Newfoundland and Quebec). Four decisions
were issued per curiam, a much higher proportion of per curiam decisions then rendered
by the Laskin Court during the equivalent time.77 An additional three decisions were
unanimous, suggesting a high level (7 out of 13 or 54%) of agreement among the Court
on advisory issues. Of the remaining split decisions, only two – the Patriation Reference
and the Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia and Related Areas Reference had
multiple dissents.78
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Table 1 Advisory Opinions (Laskin Court)
Case

Origin

Structure

Case Type

Re Anti Inflation
Act

Reference
by
Governorin-Council

Constitutional

Re Agricultural
Products
Marketing

On appeal
from ON
Court of
Appeal

Re Authority of
Parliament in
relation to the
Upper House
Re Residential
Tenancies Act,
1979

Reference
by
Governorin-Council
Provincial
appeal from
ON Court of
Appeal
On appeal
from MB,
NF and QC
Courts of
Appeal

Majority,
concurrence,
dissent
(Beetz,
Grandpré)
Majority
with
unwritten
dissent79
(Spence and
Dickson)
Per curium

Re Resolution to
amend the
Constitution

Re Newfoundland
and Labrador
Corporation Ltd.
et al. v. Attorney
General of
Newfoundland

Provincial
appeal from
NF Court of
Appeal

Dominant
Characteristic
Institutional

Constitutional;
Resource

Federalism

Constitutional

Guardian of
the
Constitution

Unanimous

Constitutional

Guardian of
the
Constitution

Majority
with two
dissents
(Martland
and Ritchie)
(Laskin,
Estey,
McIntyre)
Unanimous

Constitutional

Guardian of
the
Constitution

Constitutional;
Resource

N/A

opinions, it is not particularly relevant to the discourses used by the Court in the way that it is discussed
here.
79

Dubin J.A. dissenting only as to the validity of s. 2(2)(a) of the federal Agricultural Products Marketing
Act and of s. 4(a) of the Ontario Egg Order.
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Re Objection by
Quebec to a
Resolution to
amend the
Constitution
Re Exported
Natural Gas Tax

On appeal
from QC
Court of
Appeal

Per Curium

Constitutional

Guardian of
the
Constitution

Provincial
appeal from
AB Court of
Appeal

Constitutional;
Resource

Guardian of
the
Constitution

Re McEvoy v.
Attorney General
for New
Brunswick et al.
Re Newfoundland
Continental Shelf

On appeal
from NB
Court of
Appeal
Reference
from
Governor In
Council
On appeal
from NF
Court of
Appeal
On appeal
from BC
Court of
Appeal

Majority
with one
dissent
(Laskin,
McIntyre,
Lamer)
Per curium

Constitutional;
Criminal

Guardian of
the
Constitution

Per curium

Constitutional;
Resource

Guardian of
the
Constitution

Unanimous

Constitutional;
Resource

Federalism

Majority
with two
dissents
(Ritchie)
(Wilson)
Majority
with one
dissent
(Dickson and
Chouinard)

Constitutional;
Resource

Guardian of
the
Constitution
(Negligible)

Criminal

Public Will
(Negligible)

Upper Churchill
Water Rights
Reversion Act
Ownership of the
Bed of the Strait
of Georgia and
Related Areas
Wiretap
Reference

On appeal
from AB
Court of
Appeal
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Table 2 Advisory Opinions (McLachlin Court)
Case

Origin

Structure

Case Type

Re Firearms Act
(Can)

Provincial
appeal from
AB
Reference
by
Governorin-Council
On appeal
from QC
Court of
Appeal
On appeal
from QC
Court of
Appeal

Per Curium

Constitutional

Per Curium

Constitutional;
Civil

Unanimous

Constitutional

Public Will

Plurality,
plurality, one
dissent
(Cromwell)

Constitutional;
Criminal

Guardian of
the
Constitution,
Federalism

On appeal
from PEI
Court of
Appeal
Reference
by
Governorin-Council
Reference
by
Governorin-Council
Reference
by
Governorin-Council

Unanimous

Tort

N/A

Per Curium

Constitutional

Per Curium

Constitutional

Federalism,
Guardian of
the
Constitution
Guardian of
the
Constitution

Majority, one
dissent
(Moldaver)

Constitutional

Re Same Sex
Marriage

Re Employment
Insurance Act
(Can) ss. 22 and
23
Re Assisted
Human
Reproduction
Act
Re Broome v PEI

Re Securities Act

Re Senate
Reform

Re Supreme
Court Act, ss. 5
and 6

Dominant
Characteristic
Guardian of
the
Constitution
Guardian of
the
Constitution

Federalism,
Guardian of
the
Constitution

The subject matter of the reference cases is also of great interest. While all 13 were noted
to address questions of constitutional law in the case summary provided by the Court,
almost half (N=6) were cases that dealt with some aspect of natural resource distribution
or ownership. These decisions, including cases on access to resource deposits, water
rights and agricultural products, appeared to consume the Court’s reference docket from
the 1970s to the early 1980s. Of course, this is commensurate with the debate over and
ultimate institution of section 92A, which altered the balance of natural resource rights to
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favour the provinces, in the Constitution Act, 1867. Two further cases dealt with
constitutional law as they relate to criminal matters. Yet, in summary, the Court, in this
era, exclusively dealt with constitutional matters in their advisory opinions.
The McLachlin Court, by contrast, provided only 8 advisory opinions, half of which were
questions asked directly by the Governor-in-Council. Of the remaining 4 cases, 2 cases
were on appeal from Quebec, one from Alberta and one from PEI. Again, four decisions
were issued per curiam and an additional two decisions were unanimous. It is possible
that a high rate on unanimity reflects the need to appear to be in consensus, particularly in
higher profile reference cases, particularly since the overall rate in unanimous and per
curiam decisions is higher in this subset of cases than it is in the Court’s unanimity rate
from 1949 to 2017 (56%).80 Similar to the Laskin Court, the McLachlin Court showed a
high level of agreement in reference cases with only two divided decisions: one
containing two plurality decisions and one a majority with a lone dissent (the Assisted
Human Reproduction Act Reference). Almost all cases revolved around constitutional
questions with one (the Same Sex Marriage Reference having a strong civil dimension),
one (the Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference) having a criminal aspect, and the
lone non-constitutional case (Broome v PEI) dealing with a tort matter.81
Turning to the question of which narratives were dominant in these reference decisions,
we can observe two notable trends embedded in the written decisions of each Court. To
explore the dominant themes of the case, I summed the number of thematic codes (see
Appendix B for the detailed coding guide) across each case. Tables 1 and 2 feature each
case, listed with its dominant theme and a secondary theme, if appropriate. Where use of
any of the themes was scant, the presence of the theme is noted as being “negligible”.
Tables 3 and 4 clarify the relative “strength” of that theme by observing the number of
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sentences coded as belonging to one or more themes. It is first useful to note that overall
numbers of thematic cues are low (ranging from none to 43). Given the considerable
length of these documents, it may initially appear that an obvious finding is that the Court
quite simply does not engage in as much narrative cueing as the literature might suggest.
However, this is likely a product of the amount of space the Court dedicates to material
that is not coded in this exercise (see Appendix B), such as the text of decisions,
repetition of legislative sections, and so forth. Additionally, while only specific sentences
that cue a specific theme were coded as such, it is often the case that the surrounding text
reinforces a consistent theme even if the text itself does not explicitly cue the theme. In
this sense, the results reported here may be conservative, but they are likely more
nuanced than they might have been had wider swaths of text been coded simply because
they accompany a thematic cue.
Not all cases presented strong elements of the four narratives. In some, such as
Newfoundland and Labrador Corporation Ltd. et al. v. Attorney General of
Newfoundland [1982] (Laskin) and Broome v. Prince Edward Island [2010] (McLachlin),
the Court made no mention of any of the four narratives. In two others, Ownership of the
Bed of the Strait of Georgia and Related Areas [1984] and the Wiretap Reference [1984],
there was only scant mention of one theme. Of course, as suggested in the methodology
section, it is not necessary that the Court would conform to any of these narratives,
therefore the absence of such thematic cues is a reflection of the wide variety of roles
played by the Court and the fact that other thematic elements (not expanded upon here)
may play into the Court’s presentation of the law.
Turning, however, to those cases that did feature one or more of the four outline
narratives illustrates that these four hypothesized themes are, indeed, present in the
Courts’ reasoning of a vast array of legal subject matter. Starting with the Laskin Court,
Figure 1 gives us an overview of the distribution of thematic cues (all cases aggregated).
Almost 60% of all coded statements were in relation to the Guardian of the Constitution
theme. A further 30% were coded as representing the Federalism theme, leaving only
10% coded as Institutional and less than 1% coded as Public Will. These initial findings
promote several useful observations: first, it is clear that the Laskin Court articulates its
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decisions predominantly according to the two most common themes associated with the
Court – their role in adjudicating the constitutional order and maintaining the workings of
federalism. Second, the overwhelming emphasis on constitutional questions, as opposed
to federalism, may reflect the pending constitutional renegotiations, but also the relative
cooperative era in federalism that predated the comparatively raucous inter-governmental
affairs of the early 1980s. Finally, the lack of Public Will narrative statements suggests,
as we might expect, that the Court, pre-Charter, did not see itself as an instrument of the
public interest and instead, reflected more traditional notions of the Court as an arbiter of
governmental issues.
Figure 1 Thematic Distribution (Laskin Court)
Distribution of Themes (Laskin Court)

0.50%
10.10%
29.80%

Institutional
Public Will
Guardian of Constitution
Federalism
59.60%
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Figure 2 Thematic Distribution (McLachlin Court)
Distribution of Themes (McLachlin Court)
4.80%
8.60%

Institutional

35.40%

Public Will
Guardian of Constitution
Federalism

51.20%

Breaking this analysis down by case (see Tables 3 and 4) reveals the considerable amount
of variation in the application of these narratives. The 10% of Institutional cues come
primary from the Reference re Anti-Inflation Act where the Court appeared to take the
part of the federal executive in protecting their agenda (see below for an expansion of this
analysis). We see similar, though less pronounced tendencies in the Agricultural
Products Marketing Reference, the Residential Tenancies Act Reference and the
Patriation Reference. As the Institutional frame is representative of a more protective
stance of the federal government, anticipated to be the leading government, it is perhaps
one that we might expect to see less from a judicial body that values its independence
from the executive. It differentiates itself from the Guardian or Federalism narrative
because it is an example of the (rare) instance wherein the Court appears to defer to the
executive’s agenda rather than simply delineating federal-provincial boundaries from a
constitutional or (relatedly) jurisdictional control.
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Federalism

Constitution

Guardian of

Public Will

Institutional

Table 3 Thematic Distributions by Case (Laskin Court)

Anti-Inflation Act [1976]

10

4

5

Agricultural Products Marketing [1978] (Egg

4

3

11

7

2

Reference II)
Authority of Parliament in Relation to the Upper
House [1980]
Residential Tenancies Act [1981]

2

6

4

Resolution to Amend the Constitution [1981]

3

43

19

Constitution of Canada [1982]

9

5

Exported Natural Gas and Gas Liquids Tax [1982]

25

5

McEvoy v. Attorney General (NB) Court of Unified

7

1

Newfoundland Continental Shelf [1984]

5

1

Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act [1984]

2

3

Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia and

1

Newfoundland and Labrador Corporation Ltd. et al.
v. Attorney General of Newfoundland [1982]

Criminal Jurisdiction [1983]

Related Areas [1984]
The Wiretap Reference [1984]

1

Total Percentage of all Codes

10%

*Modal Theme in Bold
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.5%

59.5%

30%

Firearms Act (Can) [2000]
Same Sex Marriage [2004]

1

Employment Insurance Act (Can) ss22 and 23 [2005]
Assisted Human Reproduction Act [2010]

Federalism

Constitution

Guardian of

Public Will

Institutional

Table 4 Thematic Distributions by Case (McLachlin Court)

6

1

2

3

1

13

7

2

16

10

28

40

34

2

1

Broome v. Prince Edward Island [2010]
Securities Act [2011]

1

Senate Reform [2014]
Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6 (Nadon) [2014]
Total Percentage of all Codes

8

2

13

18

5%

9%

51%

35%

*Modal Theme in Bold
The Federalism narrative has a stronger presence than its Institutional counterpart in the
Laskin era, but not nearly as strong as that of the Guardian of the Constitution narrative.
The Federalism narrative is predominant in only one case (the Agricultural Products
Marketing Reference), where it receives 4 mentions. It is the primary narrative in one
other (The Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act Reference) (N=3), but narrative
content in that reference is both close in number to that of the Guardian narrative (N=2)
and decidedly low overall, therefore, the finding is less compelling. The majority of
advisory opinions provided by the Laskin Court fall into the category of majority
Guardian narratives. Two in particular, the Patriation Reference and the Exported
Natural Gas Reference have strong Guardian narrative elements, the former with a
complementary Federalism narrative component as well. That the former case – one that
specifically deals with the subject matter of amending the Constitution – has a strong
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Guardian narrative is not at all surprising and, indeed, very much in line with extant
research on the subject.82 However, the latter is of interest. As of one of six references in
this era that focus on resource-related questions (four of which are also categorized as
Guardian narratives83), the preponderance of Guardian narrative cues in this particular
reference is notable. The decision is the first of five references that deal with the
distribution of resource wealth or opportunities between the two levels of government
and, as such, set the tone for the Court’s response to resource issues, particularly in a time
of evolving jurisdictional questions with the adoption of section 92A in 1982.
Turning to the McLachlin Court’s use of narrative elements, Figure 2 displays the
narrative distribution from 2000 to 2017. Notably, the general trend found in the Laskin
data holds for the McLachlin Court. The Guardian of the Constitution narrative is the
dominant narrative (51%), followed by the Federalism narrative (35%). Interestingly, the
relative frequency of the Institutional and Public Will narratives remains low overall, but
their individual prominence is reversed. Also relevant is the subtle loss of dominance of
the Guardian narrative and the relative increase in the use of the Federalism narrative.
Looking to the individual cases, we have no clear examples of a dominant Institutional
narrative with only three cases making use of this narrative in any capacity. By contrast,
we see one clear example of the Public Will narrative take hold (in the Employment
Insurance Act Reference). Contrary to what one might expect, there is a lack of Public
Will thematic cues in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference. Given the societal shift of the
time toward public acceptance and approval of same-sex marriage, the Court appeared
reluctant to explicitly use the language of the will of public in its reasoning. As might be
expected, the same two narratives (Guardian and Federalism) that drove the reasoning in
the Laskin era are prominent again, but this time in greater balance with one another. As
evident in Table 4, two cases have a clear majority Federalism narrative (the Securities
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See Mathen, supra note 9.

83

The fifth – the Newfoundland and Labrador Corporation Ltd. et al. v. Attorney General of
Newfoundland Reference – is excluded as it did not posses any relevant narrative cues.
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Act Reference and the Supreme Court Act Reference), while the Guardian narrative is
predominant in the Senate Reform Reference and the Assisted Human Reproduction Act
Reference. To a lesser extent, the Same Sex Marriage Reference and the Firearms Act
Reference also posses a Guardian element, but much weaker than the others listed in this
category with only 3 and 6 mentions, respectively.
Yet, contrasted with the Laskin era, the case distribution is perhaps more surprising.
Cases in the Laskin era that possessed a strong Guardian dimension were often around
the era of the actual constitutional negotiations and patriation. By contrast, those that are
noted as Guardian cases in the McLachlin era reference a wider variety of subject matter
including criminal matters (Firearms Reference), civil matters (Same Sex Marriage
Reference), health (the Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference) and finance (the
Securities Act Reference), among others. Similarly, cases that that might be expected to
have a strong Public Will element (the Same Sex Marriage Reference and the Assisted
Human Reproduction Act Reference) have comparatively little or no references to this
theme.
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Table 5 Majority/Dissent Thematic Comparisons
Case

Structure

Majority

Dissent Themes

Themes
Re Anti Inflation Act

Majority, concurrence,

(Laskin)

dissent (Beetz,

Institutional

Guardian of the
Constitution

Grandpré)
Re Agricultural

Majority with unwritten

Federalism

No theme

Products Marketing

dissent84 (Spence and

(Laskin)

Dickson)

Re Resolution to

Majority with two

Guardian of the

Guardian of the

amend the

dissents (Martland and

Constitution

Constitution

Constitution

Ritchie) (Laskin, Estey,

(Laskin)

McIntyre)

Re Exported Natural

Majority with one

Guardian of the

Guardian of the

Gas Tax (Laskin)

dissent (Laskin,

Constitution

Constitution

No theme

Guardian of the

McIntyre, Lamer)
Ownership of the

Majority with two

Bed of the Strait of

dissents (Ritchie)

Constitution

Georgia and Related

(Wilson)

(Negligible)

Areas (Laskin)
Wiretap Reference

Majority with one

No theme

(Laskin)

dissent (Dickson and

Public Will
(Negligible)

Chouinard)
Re Assisted Human

Plurality, plurality, one

Guardian of the

Reproduction Act

dissent (Cromwell)

Constitution,

(McLachlin)
Re Supreme Court

No theme

Federalism
Majority, one dissent

84

Federalism,

Institutional

Dubin J.A. dissenting only as to the validity of s. 2(2)(a) of the federal Agricultural Products Marketing
Act and of s. 4(a) of the Ontario Egg Order.
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Act, ss. 5 and 6

(Moldaver)

Guardian of the

(McLachlin)

(Negligible)

Constitution

One last element of empirical analysis that provides a useful contrast is comparing
narrative tendencies in divided decisions. Tables 5 and 6 provide the dominant narrative
themes for the majority and dissents in those decisions that have more than one (nonconcurring) reasoning. Some interesting trends can be observed in comparing the data
between the Laskin and McLachlin Courts. First, in all but a few cases, the trends
discourses found in the majority decision are found in the dissenting opinions – often to a
greater extent. Interestingly, in the case of the Patriation Reference, while the same
narratives were used in the majority decision and the dissent, a greater number of all three
narratives (Institutional, Guardian and Federalism) were present in the dissent than the
majority opinion, signalling that the dissenting judges were particular concerned with
establishing their voice with respect to these frequently used narratives. The same was
true in the Exported Natural Gas Tax Reference. However, not all dissents follow the
majority. In the Anti-Inflation Act Reference, the dissent made use of the Guardian
narrative, which was absent from the majority’s written opinion. In the Agricultural
Products Marketing Reference, the dissent used no thematic cues; all were observed in
the majority’s decision. Finally, in the two split decisions in the McLachlin era, narratives
were found almost exclusively in the majorities’ decisions, with the dissents omitting any
of the four narratives almost completely.
As these findings relate to the stated hypotheses, we do see evidence of all four narratives
to varying degree. However, we see no particular trend toward one style of decision
(unanimous vs. divided decision) or even one era of the Court using narratives more than
others. Rather, the dominant trends appear to be related to how often both Courts use two
of the four themes – the Guardian of the Constitution and the Federalism themes – to a
far greater extent than the others. There is some evidence, as noted above, that the Public
Will narrative was all but absent in the pre-Charter era – confirming with the expectations
in the comparative hypothesis. However, the overall rate of the use of the Public Will
narrative is too low to truly be able to extract a meaningful trend. Another nuanced, but
ultimately limited finding relates to the use of the Institutional theme – one that was used

40

to a great extent in the Anti-Inflation Act Reference, but little elsewhere (across either era
of the Court).
Table 6 Majority/Dissent Thematic Comparisons

Federalism

Guardian

Public Will

Institutional

Dissent

Federalism

Guardian

Public Will

Institutional

Majority

Laskin
Re Anti Inflation Act

10

4

Re Agricultural Products Marketing

4

3

11

Re Resolution to amend the Constitution

3

16
6

Re Exported Natural Gas Tax
Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of

4

1

6

27

13

1

19

4

0

1

Georgia and Related Areas
Wiretap Reference

1

McLachlin
Re Assisted Human Reproduction Act

1

Re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6

7

2

16

10

13

18

1

While the empirical analysis provides a useful guide to aggregate trends in the two eras
of the Court’s decision, further exploration of the individual themes through exemplar
cases is a useful way to comment in greater depth on how these themes are applied in
advisory opinions. The analysis below takes four cases, each of which contains a high
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proportion of one of the four narratives. Two cases, the Patriation Reference (Guardian
of the Constitution) and the Anti-Inflation Act Reference (Institutional) are found within
the Laskin era, while the other two, the Securities Act Reference (Federalism) and the
Employment Insurance Act Reference (Public Will), are a product of the McLachlin era
(see Table 7). These four cases were chosen, not only because they represent archetypal
cases, but because one in each pair includes one of the two dominant themes. Where
useful, I bring in narrative comparisons with additional cases from the other era of the
Court, specifically where there is evidence of evolution in the use of that narrative. In this
way, I am able to perform cross- and within-case comparisons.

Table 7 Exemplar Cases
Court

Laskin

McLachlin

Origin
Governor In Council

Appeal from Province

Anti Inflation Act

Patriation Reference

Reference [1976]

[1981]

Securities Act

Employment Insurance Act

Reference [2011]

(Can) ss 22 and 23 [2005]

4.2 Four Narratives Unbound: Exemplar Cases
Guardian of the Constitution
Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution [1981] 1 SCR 753
The 1981 Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution is one of the more welltread pieces of Supreme Court jurisprudence.85 The details of the Patriation Reference
(as it is often called) are well-known and not recounted in detail here; however, the
general thrust of the case was that it arose from three provincial appeals from Manitoba,

85

See Peter H. Russell, “The Patriation and Quebec Veto References: The Supreme Court Wrestles with
the Political Part of the Constitution” (2011) 54 SCLR (2d) 69, Mathen, supra note 9, among others.
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Newfoundland and Quebec – each having posed questions to their own Courts of Appeal
about the level of accord required for the patriation of the Constitution (in the proposed
Constitution Act, 1981), which would ultimately take place the following year. While the
nature of the questions posed by the provinces was similar, the Court faced a challenge in
navigating a series of complex legal issues with a heavy political dimension. To say that
the Patriation Reference was a clear example of shifting the venue to obtain a strategic
advantage in inter-governmental relations is an understatement.86
Without repeating the lengthy text of the three sets of reference questions, they can be
summarized as dealing with two core issues: First, whether the federal government had
the ability to unilaterally request an amendment of the Constitution (which had to be done
through Westminster)87, and second, whether there is a convention or a constitutional
obligation that the federal government should have the agreement of the provinces to
amend the Constitution as it relates to federal-provincial relations.88 These can be
referred to as the constitutional question and the convention question, respectively.89
The complexity of the questions gave rise to an equally complicated set of answers. In
their divided decision (two majority opinions and two dissents – one on the constitutional
question and one on the issue of conventions), the Court found common ground on the
first question: the federal government’s proposed amendment of the constitution was
indeed “within the legislative competence of the Houses of the Parliament of Canada
notwithstanding the fact that it affected provincial legislative powers.”90 On the second
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See Mathen, supra note 9.
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Declining to answer, the Manitoba Court of Appeal described Question 1 as “premature”:

88

Newfoundland included a fourth questions specific to the province’s consent which the Court declined to
answer. Quebec framed its two questions (each with its own two sub-questions along similar lines, but
using different text.
89

Russell, supra note 85.

90

Patriation Reference, supra note 11 at 758. Martland and Ritchie JJ. asked whether Parliament
possessed the legal authority to pass a resolution, arguing that such an act would be inconsistent with the
federal arrangement as determined in the BNA Act, 1867.
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issue, the Court reaffirmed the existence and value of conventions, and indeed, agreed
that there was a convention of a “substantial degree of provincial consent”91, but they
stopped short of saying that conventions were justiciable.92
The Court appeared well-aware that they were engaging in a meta-constitutional analysis
that was outside of their routine case load. Thus, it is unsurprising that they elected to
articulate what Mathen refers to as “a narrative focused on structural legitimacy and
systemic safeguards” of the Constitution – a sort of conservation effort of the original
constitutional order, lest the appetite for a new constitutional legacy ran roughshod over
the existing constitutional structure.93 In their expression of their own role in this
decision, the justices, both in their majority opinions and in their respective dissents made
clear that they were articulating the bounds of the constitution.
Writing for the majority, the Chief Justice applied the Guardian narrative in two areas in
particular. The first is with respect to the preservation of the federal arrangement as it is
envisaged in the 1867 British North America Act. Speaking to the issue of whether the
proposed amendments would risk the positions of the provinces and their spheres of
influence, ultimately rendering Canada a quasi-unitary state, the Chief Justice noted,
“[T]hat is not what the present Resolution envisages because the essential federal
character of the country is preserved under the enactments proposed by the Resolution.”94
In doing so, he made a clear statement of the Court’s protection of the federal character
of the country by preserving the hierarchy of the federal government’s authority over the
provinces in key areas (also an articulation of the Institutional motivation). Continuing
on, the Chief Justice further preserved the constitutional structure, again basing the
Court’s argument for constitutional authority in the text of the British North America Act.
The proposed Constitution Act, he argued, “does not, either in terms or by implication,
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Patriation Reference, supra note 11 at 904-905.
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See Mathen, supra note 9 at 164.
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Ibid at 165.
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Patriation Reference, supra note 11 at 807.
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control this authority or require that it [federal authority] be subordinated to provincial
assent. Nor does the Statute of Westminster, 1931 interpose any requirement of such
assent. If anything, it leaves the position as it was before its enactment. Developments
subsequent thereto do not affect the legal position.”95 Such statements make clear the
Court’s position as a protector of the structure of the constitution, and the structure of the
constitution, itself, as protecting, rather than undermining federalism.
The second area where the majority applied the Guardian narrative was in its response to
the issue of whether convention dictated that the provinces must consent to the
amendment of the constitution and therefore the proposed Constitution Act. Again, the
Chief Justice relied on the reinforcement of the constitutional order using the text of the
BNA itself to justify limitations placed on the use of convention in the legal order. After
canvassing the material presented to the bench by provincial counsel that argued the
presence of applicability of a provincial consent convention, the Chief Justice used
several short statements that evoked the Guardian narrative. The majority concluded that
counsel for the appeal had not produced evidence of “explicit recognition of a convention
as having matured into a rule of law”96 and that the “attempted assimilation of the growth
of a convention to the growth of the common law is misconceived.”97 In taking a more
textual tone to the constitution, the Chief Justice further placed strong bounds around the
(then-) present constitutional order by rejecting the argument that the case law presented
to the Court had given legal force to conventions – an argument, that the Chief Justice
called “an over-drawn proposition.”98 These forceful statements and their collocutors
would contribute to a narrative that would ultimately contribute to a (albeit complex)
constitutional order that valued the many unwritten aspects of common law, including the
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Ibid at 808.

96

Ibid at 774.
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Ibid at 775.
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Ibid at 775.
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convention, but placed firm bounds around the applicability of conventions to override
formalistic, written constitutional text.
While the Guardian discourse of protecting the integrity of the Constitution is evident in
the majority opinions, as noted above, it plays out to a greater degree in the dissents. In a
powerful dissent by Martland and Ritchie JJ, rejecting interpretations of the federal
government’s authority to amend the constitution without the consent of the provinces,
we see one of the Court’s few clear statements of its role as it related to constitutional
protection. The dissent expressly invoked the Court’s duty to uphold the structure of the
Constitution.99 In writing about the ability for the federal government to unilaterally limit
the powers of its provincial counterpart, the justices not only delineate that the powers
held by the federal government “excluded the power to do anything inconsistent with the
B.N.A. Act” and that the “exercise of such a power has no support in constitutional
convention.”100 Indeed, in their dissent, Martland and Ritchie made a rare declarative
statement of the Court’s Guardian role stating that: “it is the proper function of this Court,
in its role of protecting and preserving the Canadian constitution, to declare that no such
power exists.”101 Such clear articulation of the Guardian role makes a case for why the
Guardian narrative overpowers the others in volume and consistency across the two eras
of the Court under study here.
Similarly, in their dissent on the convention question, the Chief Justice, writing for
himself, Estey and McIntyre JJ, took a different approach to applying the Guardian
narrative. Holding that there was no legal impediment to constitutional amendment by the
federal government, the dissent also noted that there was no convention requiring
provincial consent to constitutional amendment. Despite the difference in outcome, the
judges employed a similar discourse. In defending the absence of a convention, the Chief
Justice and his colleagues positioned the Court as the arbiter and protector of the
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constitutional order through another rare explicit statement about the Court’s role. Courts,
they argued, are empowered to “recognize the existence of conventions”, particularly
when asked to do so through the reference mechanism.102 They may also strike down the
strength or legitimacy of that convention as it relates to the practice of federalism as the
Chief Justice argued later in the decision.103 Framing his reasoning as the preservation of
the constitution (“We are concerned solely with their constitutionality”), the Chief Justice
noted that the insupportability of the convention stems from the inability to bind
governments according to a particular degree of consent that nobody, including the Court,
was willing to define.104
That the Supreme Court emerged as “a critical agent of constitutional change” 105 in their
complex response to the questions posed in the Patriation Reference was, in part, their
own doing. In applying the Guardian narrative throughout their decision – both majority
and dissenting opinions – the Court not only produced the basis upon which much
subsequent legal analysis would be drawn (i.e. the emergent discussion around the value
and justiciability of conventions), but they also reiterated, regardless of their division, the
discourse of the Court as the Guardian of the Constitution – often in explicit terms.
Mathen notes the challenges associated with rendering such a divided opinion (the stigma
from which may have encouraged the later Court to issue controversial decisions per
curiam)106, however, the Court, from the Patriation Reference onward, has appeared to
wear that mantle formidably.
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Umpire of Federalism
Reference re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 SCR 837
Like the Patriation Reference, the Securities Act Reference also originated with the
concerns of the provinces. While the questions posed to the Court came from the
Governor in Council, the case addressed certain provincial governments’ concerns about
the Harper Government’s proposed Securities Act. Securities, at the time of the proposal
(and still now), were regulated at the provincial level; the intent of the federal legislation
was to create a new, national securities regulator. The Act, which never received Royal
Assent, was positioned by the provinces as falling outside the legislative authority of the
Canadian Parliament under section 91(2), the trade and commerce power. Interveners for
Alberta, Manitoba, Quebec and New Brunswick argued that the subject matter of the Act
trenched on provincial jurisdiction, namely their right to regulate securities under the
property and civil rights powers in section 92(13), and the ability to regulate matters of a
merely local nature under section 92(16).107
The per curiam decision delivered by the Court vindicated provincial concerns. The
Court held that the Act was ultra vires the federal government’s trade and commerce
power, even though it also recognized the need for and encouraged further collaboration
among the federal government and provinces to create a securities regulator at the
national level. Their reasoning for striking the legislation down was jurisdictional, but the
Court explained their decision by way of stating that the Act was counter to the
“dominant tide of modern federalism” whose hallmarks were its cooperative and flexible
nature. The decision emphasized one of the defining dimensions of the Umpire of
Federalism motivation – namely, that competing understandings of federalism might give
way to different interpretations of individual pieces of legislation or powers held by the
two levels of government. Further, how the Court viewed the federal arrangement could
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very much influence the outcome of jurisdictional debates, which were anything but
forgone conclusions.
In striking down the legislation that would establish a national securities regulator, the
Court engaged in a pith and substance analysis of the legislation. Even though securities
regulation did have aspects that legitimately fell within the bounds of trade and
commerce, the Court articulated the need to circumscribe the scope of the trade and
commerce clause to recognize “the diversity and autonomy of provincial governments in
developing their societies within their respective spheres of jurisdiction”.108 Drawing on
General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing109, the Court noted that, under
the general branch of s. 91(2), “legislation must engage the national interest in a manner
that is qualitatively different from provincial concerns”110, and the Act, which appeared
to simply amalgamate provincial power failed to do so. Yet, the Court stopped short of
truncating the trade and commerce power, moments later balancing its statements with a
declaration that, “At the same time, failure to give meaningful scope to the general trade
and commerce power would violate the notion of balance between the federal and
provincial orders of government inherent in the division of powers and impermissibly
amend the Constitution.”111 This sort of balancing statement provided for national
commercial regulation with out “endangering ‘the very idea of the local’ in provincial
commercial regulation”.112
This reinforcement of a message of balance is at the core of the Umpire of Federalism
narrative. It identifies the Court as a neutral arbiter of jurisdictional matters without
presupposing an answer to a specific question. While the Act clearly engaged matters of
national importance, the Court framed its decision in the language of differentiating –
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with precision – matters that fall clearly into one jurisdiction without taking liberties that
would derogate from the powers of the other jurisdiction. Thus, the main thrust of the Act
does not address a matter of such national importance that it could not successfully be
kept to its current provincial status is suggestive of the Court making a technical “call” on
the legislation in question to not only preserve, but balance, jurisdictional authority in a
manner that is reflective of the contemporary federation.
Here, it becomes important to differentiate between a Guardian motivation or discourse
and an Umpire of Federalism narrative. Surely, to some degree, there is overlap as the
subject matter of jurisdiction relates both to the constitutional arrangement and to
federalism. However, the distinction between the two is an important one: while the
Guardian discourse is protective of the constitutional arrangement as a whole, it values
the text and spirit of the document that created federalism. The Umpire discourse, by
contrast, is one that protects the outcome of that arrangement and, in doing so, preserves
the balance between the levels of government. Federalism, the Court notes, is created
through the “constitutional balance envisaged by ss. 91 and 92” and a failure to preserve
that balance would have an outcome of “undermin[ing] the federalism principle”. 113 This
motivation is further evident in the Court’s statement:
It is a fundamental principle of federalism that both federal and provincial powers must
be respected, and one power may not be used in a manner that effectively eviscerates
another. Rather, federalism demands that a balance be struck, a balance that allows both
the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures to act effectively in their respective
spheres. Accepting Canada’ interpretation of the general trade and commerce power
would disrupt rather than maintain that balance. Parliament cannot regulate the whole of
the securities system simply because aspects of it have a national dimension.114
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Such a statement is a clear indictment of government action outside of the bounds of the
federal arrangement, even if such action is viewed as normatively desirable by other
provinces, the federal government or the Court itself.
Yet, one cannot blindly state that, in using the Umpire narrative, the Court pursues a strict
delineation of powers to stifle government activity. Rather, the Court used the Umpire
narrative to encourage the levels of government to enhance federalism by continuing to
operate in a manner that allowed both to flourish. Much like the analogy of the umpire,
the Court used its position to articulate for a fair and cooperative approach to resolving a
policy dispute, alluding to “the spirit of cooperative federalism” 115, cooperation as an
“animating force” of federalism116, and “a restrained approach to doctrines like federal
paramountcy”117. Of course, this discourse is reflective of a contemporary version of
federalism that stems from the cooperative federalism that emerged in the post-war era
and re-emerged in the form of collaborative federalism in the late 1990s.118 This
discourse of cooperation was further evident in the Court’s encouragement of the
provincial and federal government to continue to work on a coordinated scheme for
securities regulation. Speaking to the subject matter of the case, the Court went as far as
to note that the “experience of other federations in the field of securities regulation, while
a function of their own constitutional requirements, suggests that a cooperative approach
might usefully be explored”.119
Another way in which the Court pronounces its umpire role is through its rejection of
rigidity and strict textual interpretations of the constitution. Unlike the Guardian
motivation, which might more readily adhere to textual principles, the Umpire discourse
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eschews “rigid formalism in favour of accommodating cooperative intergovernmental
efforts”.120 Citing its earlier decision in OPSEU, the Court downplayed watertight
compartments, stating that there were not “the dominant tide of constitutional doctrines;
rather they have been an undertow against the strong pull of pith and substance, the
aspect doctrine and, in recent years, a very restrained approach to concurrency and
paramountcy issues”.121
Yet, one does not have to be satisfied with a reading of the Court’s ratio alone to accept
the Umpire narrative. Similar to statements made in the Patriation Reference, the Court
formally articulated its role as an Umpire. Referencing the distinction between
jurisdictional powers made within sections 91 and 92, the Court identifies itself as the
logical “impartial arbiter of jurisdictional disputes”. Referencing its earlier decisions in
the Reference re Remuneration of Judges and Northern Telecom Canada122, the Court
repeats its unique position as the arbiter who is able to “control the limits of the
respective sovereignties”.123 Such a clear statement of the Umpire motivation, not only as
a discourse upon which the Court could rely to articulate its rulings, but also as a broader
raison d’être, is telling of the depth of the Umpire discourse in the Court’s view of its
place among the branches of government.
While the Court did note their inability to condone legislation that was ultimately ultra
vires, they concluded their analysis on a reconciling note. Reiterating their message of
cooperative and flexible federalism, the Court suggested that a scheme that recognizes
the essentially provincial nature of securities regulation while allowing Parliament to deal
with genuinely national concerns remains available. In suggesting this path forward, they
emphasized that, while flexibility and cooperation are important to federalism, they
cannot override or modify the separation of powers. In a statement that truly reflects the
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umpire motivation, the Court stopped short of cooperation at any cost and reiterated that
balance between the two levels of government would only come with “the respect that
each level of government has for each other’s own sphere of jurisdiction”.124 “The
federalism principle upon which Canada’ constitutional framework rests,” they argued
demands nothing less.”125

Institutional
Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 SCR 373
The Reference re the Anti-Inflation Act was the first reference case of the Laskin era. The
decision, which featured a majority opinion written by the Chief Justice, a concurrence
penned by Ritchie J, and a dissent by Beetz J (joined by de Grandpré J) was one of the
few that featured an Institutional narrative. The decision deviated from almost all other
Supreme Court references in that it takes a very strong opinion in favour of the federal
government’s right to legislate in economic matters that have serious implications for the
provinces, but it also uses, to great effect, the vocabulary of protecting the federal
government’s emergency powers (outside of wartime) in matters of national concern.
The case is derived from the federal government’s enactment of the Anti-Inflation Act126
in 1975, and its subsequent questions posed through the Governor-in-Council to the
Court with respect to whether the law was ultra vires the federal government’s power to
legislate to combat inflation. Inflation is not a specifically enumerated area of policy
jurisdiction under section 91 or 92, nor are the circumstances around the Act simple
enough to house under the federal trade and commerce power; however, Parliament was
basing the legislation of price and wage controls to combat inflation on the “peace, order
and good government” (POGG) clause, more specifically, the idea of a national
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emergency that required the federal government to step into an area that had both national
and provincial implications. Though the Act in question did not specifically mention
emergency conditions, the Court ruled that the “highly exceptional economic conditions
in time of peace”127 (as outlined in a White Paper that preceded the Act – discussed
below) provided sufficient cause for the Court to recognize the national concern
dimension that motivated the implementation of the Act.
The locus of the Institutional motivation in this case comes from the majority reasoning
and Ritchie, Martland and Pigeon JJ’s concurrence. Writing for the majority, the Chief
Justice situates his answer in a broader understanding of the importance of federalism, a
recognition of the power of the provinces to regulate their own civil services, as well as
the trend toward cooperative federalism that led up to the 1976 decision, but denies that
an inarticulation of the federal power is required to maintain it.128 He goes so far as to
say that an attempt to engage the provinces on the matter is not required; rather, even
though a cooperative agreement “might have been attempted, […] it does not follow that
the federal policy that was adopted is vulnerable because a co-operative scheme on a
legislative power basis was not tried first”.129 In doing so, the Chief Justice dislocates
this case from what might be perceived as a traditional Umpire of Federalism narrative.
Rather than encouraging inter-government cooperation (as was done in the
aforementioned Securities Act Reference), the Court specifically states that this type of
cooperation was possible, but not required. In doing so, the Court articulated a different
narrative in dealing with a matter related to federalism: namely, that there are times
where umpiring the federal arrangement might be superseded by a clear statement of
federal authority.
Located within that understanding of the desirability, but lack of requirement, of a federal
arrangement, the Chief Justice notes the strength of the federal government’s position to
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enact such legislation under the POGG clause. Referencing the preamble to the Act, he
notes that the text was “sufficiently indicative that Parliament was introducing a farreaching programme prompted by what in its view was a serious national condition”.130
He contradicts the submissions of the provinces noting that their interpretation of the Act
as trenching on their control of their own public services “misconceive[s] the paramount
authority of federal legislative power when exercised, and the all-embracing legislative
authority of the Parliament of Canada when validly exercised for the peace, order and
good government of Canada”.131 Therein lies the Chief Justice’s Institutional narrative.
By positioning the Act as a clear manifestation of the “all-embracing legislative
authority” of the federal government, he distinguishes the unique motivation of the Court
to preserve federal authority under an interpretive clause that could have just as easily
been narrowed through the Court’s ruling.
Concurring with the Chief Justice, Ritchie J, notes the critical nature of the Act and the
location of Parliament’s authority to deal with it in the POGG clause. While Ritchie J
varies slightly from the Chief Justice’s reasoning, he notes the need for the Act to be
interpreted in conjunction with a White Paper on the state of the concern that preceded
the Act. This is an essential element of the Institutionalist discourse. While the federal
government did not use the vocabulary of “emergency” or “peace, order and good
government” in the Act, the Supreme Court appeared to read into the legislation an
element of “serious national concern” that could give force to the use of the POGG
power. According to Ritchie J, when the Act is “read against the background of these
excerpts from the White Paper it becomes apparent that they were employed by
Parliament in recognition of the existence of a national Emergency”.132 The Court, of
course, did not have to articulate this depth of the national dimension for the federal
government and could have, just as easily, rebuked the legislative efforts of that

130

Ibid at 422.

131

Ibid at 430.

132

Ibid at 438.

55

government for failing to motivate its case. However, the Court instead protected and
upheld federal authority (with limitations) and enabled the legislation to stand.
The dissent authored by Beetz J took a different view and is a useful exemplar of a case
wherein the majority and dissent use competing narratives to frame their reasoning. In
writing for Grandpré J and himself, Beetz J gave weight to the implications of
globalisation and the fluctuations of the international market on federalism. The
accompanying narrative evoked a strong Guardian of the Constitution narrative with
Beetz noting that the growth of certain sectors – particularly those in economic policy –
were susceptible to being, pro tanto, a national matter simply because of the rapidly
globalizing nature of the domestic economies. The effect, he argued, was that, when
taken to its logical conclusion, all matters would be rendered federal powers under the
national concern dimension resulting in “a fundamental feature of the Constitution, its
federal nature, the distribution of powers between Parliament and the Provincial
Legislatures, would disappear not gradually but rapidly.”133 Contradicting federal
counsel’s submission that the Act is what Beetz J calls an “an erroneous characterization
of the Anti-Inflation Act” and argues that the Act itself and federal counsel’s articulation
of its purpose are “quite distinguishable and they do not, in my view, stand for what they
are said to stand”.134 In doing so, Beetz J gives rise to an interpretation of the Act as
disrupting the constitutional order and needing to be limited to prevent jurisdictional
creep.
The conflict between the majority and the dissent notwithstanding, as noted above, it is
essential that we think of the Institutional motivation not as wholly contradictory to the
Guardian or Umpire motivation, but as a sort of version or outcome of these that
emphasizes the Court’s relationship in upholding federal authority. The Anti-Inflation Act
Reference is noted as much for the Court’s decision to allow the legislation to stand as it
is for the limits placed on the mandate given to the federal government by making that
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legislation temporary. Among the more important observations about the Court’s
Institutional narrative is that, in its reasoning, the Court limited the possibility that the
POGG power was to be dramatically expanded, but opened up the possibility of fairly
easy access to the emergency use of the power in peacetime.135 It also gave rise to the
observation that the Court is able to rule in the favour of the federal government while
still upholding the balance of power and preventing further centralization of policymaking authority.136
The Court’s decision in the Anti-Inflation Act Reference went on to have implications for
a host of future SCC decisions. In particular, the Court’s ruling on emergency economic
conditions would come up again in the Provincial Judges Reference twenty years later.
While the outcome of that decision is often contested because of the Court’s own
perceived strategic ruling137, it is also a case wherein the Court used its considerable
authority to weigh into complex economic matters.

Public Will
Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23, [2005] 2 SCR 669, 2005
SCC 56
The final narrative captured in this study, like the Institutional narrative before it, is one
that receives considerably less attention than its Guardian and Umpire collocutors. The
Employment Insurance Act Reference came up on an appeal, by right, from the Quebec
Court of Appeal in 2005. The case referred to the Court sections 22 and 23 of the federal
Employment Insurance Act, which were contested by the government of Quebec as ultra
vires the federal government’s power in social policy issues. The Government of Quebec,
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desiring to establish its own set of policies governing maternity and parental leave, asked
the federal government to reduce Quebecker’s contributions to the federal scheme to fund
the Quebec plan. In their unanimous decision, the Court upheld the legislation,
overturning the Quebec Court of Appeal’s earlier decision, and holding that the
legislation deadline with maternity and parental leave benefits is a valid exercise of the
federal jurisdiction over unemployment insurance. While the case is largely about
jurisdictional authority, the Court’s framing of its ratio brings to light a particular
emphasis on the changing social conditions that indicate a need for clarity and, indeed,
generosity in matters of income replacement for women.
The Employment Insurance Act Reference is unique in that few others contain any aspect
of the Public Will narrative. The next closest to characterising the Public Will narrative is
the Same-Sex Marriage Reference [2004], handed down by the Court in the previous
year. Perhaps in some ways, these two decisions should be considered alongside one
another, as they were both instances wherein the Court used its considerable influence to
direct public policy in line with public opinion. Though the Canadian public was perhaps
more galvanized over the issue of same-sex marriage than it was about extending
maternity and paternity benefits, both decisions reflect the Court’s willingness to enter
into the political fray on issues that have a very tangible application to the lives of many
Canadians. Of course, the Court’s decision on EI benefits is likely lesser known than its
same-sex marriage counterpart, even though maternity and paternity benefits directly
affect a greater number of Canadians. However, given that the nature of the question
posed was jurisdictional, rather than whether benefits would be assigned (they would
have, by one government or another, regardless of the outcome), it is likely that fewer
Canadians felt that the decision would have an effect on their work lives.
The question in the EI Act Reference case was whether the Act fell within federal
jurisdiction over unemployment insurance. While the Court’s response maintained the
necessary pith and substance analysis required of a jurisdictional case, the Court chose
not to limit its analysis solely to the technicalities of the constitutional assignment of
policy authority. Citing its own examination of the “living tree” metaphor in the SameSex Marriage Reference, the Court noted that it “takes a progressive approach to ensure
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that Confederation can be adapted to new social realities”.138 They note that legislative
competence is dynamic and that jurisdiction over unemployment insurance must be
interpreted “progressively and generously”

139

, signalling the Court’s willingness to

engage in policy change to reflect contemporary social norms.
Following their introductory statements about interpretive doctrines, the Court examines
the purpose of maternity benefits and the context in which unemployment insurance and
maternity benefits, more specifically, were adopted. It is here that the Public Will
narrative takes shape, but in a passive way. In their examination of context, the Court
notes the evolving nature of the workforce and the entry en masse of women into the
labour force, citing the government’s own Report of the Study for Updating the
Unemployment Insurance Programme (1968) (the Cousineau Report)140 and White
Paper, entitled Unemployment Insurance in the 70’s (1970)141, as examples of texts
where the government itself has justified the expansion of EI benefits across potentially
vulnerable groups.
Yet, it is in the section of the Court’s decision that described maternity benefits as a type
of employment insurance that the Court’s ratio truly manifests the Public Will narrative.
This takes two different forms: first, a discussion of how the evolution of the workforce
has moved to incorporate women, and second, how the evolution of family structures
have moved toward equal or shared parenting responsibility between both spouses. In the
first aspect of the Public Will narrative, the Court frames its understanding of maternity
benefits as falling with general employment benefits by emphasizing the “extent of the
protection required by Canadian society changes with the needs of the labour force”, the
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growing portion of the labour force that is made up of women, and that “particular needs
[of women in the labour force] that are of concern to society as a whole.”142 Further, the
Court signals the need for change in the way that maternity benefits are viewed by both
government and by society at large. They argue that “[a]n interruption of employment
due to maternity can no longer be regarded as a matter of individual responsibility” and
that “[t]o limit a public unemployment insurance plan […] would amount to denying its
social function”.143 The Court then concludes this analysis with a strong statement of the
Public Will narrative in noting that the “social nature of unemployment insurance
requires that Parliament be able to adapt the plan to the new realities of the
workplace.”144 Taken together, these statements correspond with an interpretation of the
development of labour and insurance practices that must retain the essence of the times
and should progress with the direction of society’s understanding of the role of labour.
The second aspect of the Court’s Public Will narrative takes on a more personal tone. In
their subsequent analysis of parental benefits more broadly, the Court again takes a
progressive stance corresponding to public opinion. In dealing with the issue of whether
adoptive parents or fathers taking paternity leave in lieu of or alongside their partner’s
maternity leave, the Court argues, “[a]t a time when society is stressing the responsibility
of both parents, they cannot be treated unequally. Such an approach would be
anachronistic”.145 They further note that two features – “the evolution of the role of
women in the labour market and of the role of fathers in child care”146 – have had
undeniable consequences for the structure of the labour market and family structures.
Here, the Court clearly eschews a reactionary approach to analyzing parental leave
benefits, commensurate with the prevailing view that both parents have parental
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responsibilities for infants. Taking their progressive approach further, the Court makes
another, subsequent bold statement in line with the Public Will narrative that is
generalizable to future social policy dilemmas. In stating that “[a] generous interpretation
of the provisions of the Constitution permits social change to be taken into account”147,
the Court is effectively noting that it will, when appropriate, use its ruling as a venue to
reinforce the prevailing opinions about the evolution of social norms.
One final note about the Employment Insurance Act Reference bears stating with specific
reference to the Court’s use of interpretive doctrines to pull out the Public Will narrative.
Inherent within the Public Will narrative is an understanding that the public will is
different from (usually cast as more progressive than) government policy and that the
Court will be the balancing or, indeed, rectifying force that will correct any imbalance
between the two. This, almost certainly, indicates a progressive interpretivist approach.
The Court begins its written decision with a declaration of the appropriateness of the
application of the living tree doctrine (see above). Of course, as is the case with other
interpretative decisions by the Court (including the above Anti-Inflation Act Reference),
the Court does not justify societal changes as carte blanche permission to change
jurisdictional boundaries: “A progressive interpretation cannot, however,” the Court
argues, “be used to justify Parliament in encroaching on a field of provincial
jurisdiction.”148 However, what is interesting about the Court’s ruling in the EI Reference
is that the Court puzzlingly evokes both interpretive and textualist interpretations in the
same breadth. Shortly after acknowledging the living tree doctrine, the Court noted, “If
an issue comes before a court, the court must refer to the framers’ description of the
power in order to identify its essential components”, but then carry on to acknowledge
that meaning “may be adapted to modern-day realities”.149 This type of reliance on both a
declaration of interpretivist and textualist modes is not necessarily as antithetical to one
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another as they might appear.150 However, it is suggestive of the fact that the Court is
willing to use the available jurisprudential tools to arrive at an outcome which it believes
is reflective of the law, and at times, social progress.
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Chapter 4
Discussion and Conclusion
At the outset of this study, I hypothesized that the reference power held more than just a
set of strategic tools for the provincial and federal executives to mobilize against one
another. I argued that one could also learn a significant amount about how the Court
viewed its role in handling complex issues of policy, federalism and jurisdiction that were
directly appealed using the tool of the reference question and that the Court may have
chosen to communicate their opinions and their understanding of their own role using
overarching narratives – namely, the guardian of the Constitution, the Umpire of
Federalism, the Institutional and the Public Will narratives. I also hypothesized that the
Court might change its evaluation framework over time, particularly when Chief Justices
change.
Through this analysis of 21 advisory opinions, issued across two Courts, I found
interesting corroborating evidence of some of these hypothesized trends, but also some
limitations as to how effectively my four-part narrative framework could be applied to
the Court’s decisions in references. Through an empirical, manual coding analysis of the
21 decisions, it was evident that all four narratives were present to some degree, but that
two of these narratives – the Guardian and Umpire narratives were predominant. While
the Public Will and Institutional narratives were present, they were sufficiently limited
enough to say that they were, at best, secondary narratives, rather than guiding
frameworks for the Court. At the same time, when these two narratives were present – as
was the case in the Anti-Inflation Act Reference and the Employment Insurance Act
Reference, they spoke to important constitutional issues that had a tremendous impact on
the economic and social policy realities of Canadians.
Further to my hypotheses on the presence of these narratives, I suggested that pivotal
moments, such as the implementation of the Charter, might elucidate notable trends or
deviations from existing trends. Importantly, there appeared to be no differentiation
between pre/post-Charter applications of the four narratives. By contrast, both the Laskin
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and the McLachlin Courts appeared to use all four to roughly the same degree. There is
some evidence that the later Court was more likely to use a narrative that conveyed the
Public Will, and that the earlier Court provided the only real instance of a Institutional
narrative that positioned the interests of the federal government above those of the
provinces, however, these observations warrant caution because there were too few cases
of the application of these narratives to truly support the outlined hypothesis.
Thus, the overarching observation to arise from this detailed analysis is that more may
unite the two Courts than separates them. The importance of the narratives that imply the
Court’s role as guarding the constitution and umpiring federalism cannot be overstated.
These appear to be the Court’s main frameworks for explaining their decision-making
process. Of course, to some extent the questions posed by the Governor-in-Council or
that are appealed to the Court from provincial courts of appeal are as much responsible
for the outcomes as the Court’s choice of narrative. While the Court can (to an extent)
choose to answer specific questions or decline, it remains that the Court has control over
its docket, but it does not have control over the reference questions asked of it. Therefore,
the Court’s narrative frameworks are inevitably structured in part by the fact that it is a
venue for inter-governmental disputes and jurisdictional resolution. Still, the Court is free
to answer the questions in almost whatever manner it chooses; therefore, the observations
about a lack of diversity in the narratives applied by the Court still hold value. They
illustrate that the Court adheres to some of its more traditionally-known roles, but will,
when the situation requires it, adopt some narratives that particularly advance political or
social ends.
What also comes out of this analysis, though is not referenced in any detail in the results
of the deductive search for the four established narratives is the presence of any other
“undetected” or “unexpected” narratives. During the process of coding the 21 advisory
opinions provided by the Court, it was not the case that new or persistent trends emerged
from a critical reading. That is to say, the narratives that emerge from the literature
appear to capture the gamut of discourses employed by the Court in dealing with
reference matters. This is an important observation if we consider that the study of
advisory opinions as a subset of the Court’s jurisprudence may yield alternative findings
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from the mainstream literature. A thorough read of that body across two eras of the Court
suggest that this is not the case, though counter-arguments could be made by further
analyses of other eras of the Supreme Court.
Finally, true “trends” in analysis appear to be difficult to extract even with a single
Court’s body of jurisprudence. Rather, it might be the case that the Courts just take
reference cases one by one and try not to use this type of case as a mode to advance one
narrative or another. It may even be the case that the Court is somewhat “freed” in
answering an advisory opinion as it deviates from its routine case load and provides the
Court, just as it does the government, an opportunity to venture into deliberations that are
difficult to draw into its standard case load.

5.1 Implications of Research
The goal of this research was to examine in detail advisory opinions as a set of judicial
writings. Though complementary to, this study ultimately deviated from single case
studies of individual advisory opinions. In doing so, there are several implications for the
substantive study of the Court’s writings, but also for the methodology of examining
large volumes of case law around several areas of jurisprudence. Unlike a
comprehensive, comparative study of several criminal or property law cases, the unifying
thread in this analysis was the legal venue, not the subject matter. The advisory opinion,
for reasons set out in the earlier portion of this paper, is a unique opportunity for
governments at both levels to engage the Court in matters of policy, constitutional or
jurisdictional conflict. Of course, it is almost always the case that the Court is dealing
with more than one of these matters, as the subject matter of each reference question was
often complex and politically-loaded. Thus, studying advisory opinions gives rise to
some important observations about the case type itself.
The primary implication drawn from this study is that the Court uses two predominant
narratives when deliberating and communicating its opinions on reference questions. This
has implications for government and implications for those studying the law. For
governments with an interest in (and the option to) refer questions to the Court, this study
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shows that the Court is somewhat conservative in the application of narratives other than
the Guardian and Umpire narratives. This may be reassuring for governments who fear
that the Court will take liberties in areas of social policy or economic policy that may
deviate from the government’s own agenda. Second, with respect to the more strategic
uses of reference questions, this analysis shows that the Court will err on the side of
marshalling the relationship between levels of government rather than redefining it.
While critics of the Court may agonize over its “liberal” nature, it appears, at least in the
case of advisory opinions, that the Court takes a fairly conservative tone in applying the
tenets of the constitution and federalism.
Another implication derived from this study related to the study of law is that the Court
does, indeed, employ narrative language to communicate its decisions. While the use of
such language is not necessarily the dominant type of communication in the written
opinions, it does frame much of the Court’s more routine exposition on past case law and
legislation in terms of generalizable frameworks through which the Court draws its
reasoning, and which can (and has been) observed by legal scholars. The presence of the
narratives may seem like a simple implication, but it remains an important one. In the
absence of these narratives, scholars would struggle to find a unifying set of themes that
guide the decisions. These narratives fall outside of the structural framework of the
Court’s decisions (e.g. the references to past case law, the interpretation of legislation or
government policy papers) and, instead, provide a set of narrative elements that
communicate broader principles upon which the Court rests its legal opinions.
Turning to methodological implications of this study, one of the chief advantages of this
study is that it provides an example of the application of a mixed-methodology,
incorporating both an empirical and a qualitative, doctrinal approach to studying the
Court’s decisions. The benefit of this approach was that it allowed an in-depth analysis of
a large body of case law over a significant amount of time (1976-2017) according to a
comprehensive, replicable scheme. Though empirical efforts (both quantitative and textbased) are less established in the study of law (coding efforts, specifically, are
particularly rare), this approach is useful in that it allows for an evaluation of the relative
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strength of each narrative on a case-by-case basis, thus permitting comparison across eras
of the Court.
The addition of the case study returns this study firmly into the mainstream of legal
analyses, particularly those that look to engage in comparative case study. Applying the
doctrinal approach to this comparative case study permitted a useful analysis, not only of
the cases themselves, but it also illustrated differences between narratives that emerged
from the two eras of the Court and from two origins of reference questions (Governor-in
Council and appeals from the provinces). By adding this systematic comparison to the
summary quantitative analysis, I am able to elucidate how I came to the observations in
the quantitative analysis and assist the reader in understanding how the narratives were
applied within the Court’s judgments.

5.2 Future Directions
This study represents a systematic, comparative analysis of 21 advisory opinions under
the guidance of two Chief Justices. Its strength lies in the breadth of decisions it covered
and in the application of the framework of narrative analysis to these cases. However,
much remains to be done in interpreting how the Court sees its role in issuing advisory
opinions or case law more generally. As suggested above, the analysis of narratives of the
21 cases did not produce any suggestion that other narratives were excluded from this
analysis and ought to be considered in future research, but it remains that this study only
looked at two eras of the Court and other past (or current) Courts may contribute others.
It also remains that analysing advisory opinions for the presence of four narratives is only
a narrow analysis of the broader question of how the Court sees its role in issuing
advisory opinions. There are a number of other analytical techniques that could be
applied to this question. Interviews with present or former Supreme Court judges are the
most obvious; however, additional review of secondary sources may also yield further
insights. Of course, these methods are limited by practical issues such as availability and
likelihood of a judge (current or former) speaking candidly on their experience with
reference questions.
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The next step for this particular project is to expand the analysis to a more historical era
of the Court to determine the origin point of these dominant narratives. One of the most
prominent metaphorical descriptions attributed to the Court (or its predecessor the JCPC)
is the “living tree” metaphor of constitutional interpretation derived from the Persons
Case. An examination of earlier Courts’ narrative construction may yield useful
information on why the Guardian and Umpire narrative have become so prominent. This
could also be gleaned from a comparison with non-reference cases from the same era as
the current analysis.
As stated in the outset of this project, advisory opinions provide a unique opportunity for
the Court to engage with the executives on questions of contemporary policy and
constitutional relevance. Their importance lies not only in the outcome of the decision,
but also in the opportunity for two branches of government, who pride themselves on
their independence, to engage with one another directly. The possibility of the
politicization of these decisions will always make them attractive for constitutional law
scholars to study, but they also have the potential to yield an abundance of insights about
the role of the Court and the vision that the Court has for its position within constitutional
order.
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Appendix 2 Coding Guide
What text is coded? Only the text of the full decision of the Supreme Court reference is
coded. Headnotes, citations and footnotes are not coded. Code both majority rulings and
dissents.
Type of Sentence

Example

Coded?

Statement of Fact

“The text of the Act specifies that…”

No

Report of or

“In giving reasons for judgment for the majority of the

No

Commentary on

Ontario Court of Appeal, MacKinnon J.A. summarized

Actions or

the main attack upon the federal and provincial

Statements of

legislation, and the orders and regulations thereunder…”

Others
Deliberations or

“…the inclusion of former advocates of at least 10 years

decisions of the

standing at the bar is consistent with the purpose of s. 5,

Court

which is to ensure that appointees to the Court have

Yes

adequate legal experience.”
Deliberations or

“Dickson C.J. explained that where the general trade

decisions of past

and commerce power is advanced as a ground of

Courts (excluding

constitutional validity, a "careful case by case analysis

JCPC)

remains appropriate" (General Motors, at p. 663).”

Explanation of

“This constitution depends then on statutes and common

general legal

law rules which declare the law and have the force of

doctrine

law, and upon customs, usages and conventions
developed in political science which, while not having
the force of law in the sense that there is a legal
enforcement process or sanction available for their
breach, form a vital part of the constitution without
which it would be incomplete and unable to serve its
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Yes

No

purpose.”
Quotes from other

“In his work on constitutional law, Peter Russell

authors

notes…”

Text of statute,

“The White Paper, after reviewing the procedures

other case law

followed in respect of amendments to the Act, went on

No

No

to state four general principles, as follows:
The first general principle that emerges...”
Coded statements are those that inherently express the Court’s view on the legal issue at
hand and embody their role as an arbiter of the issue or making a declaration about the
law.
Some statements must be read in context. For example, in the Patriation Reference (at
848): dissenting justices Martland and Ritchie state, “There is no statutory basis for the
exercise of such a power.” Reading that sentence alone does not readily suggest one
frame or another. However, in the context of the dissent, it is a clear statement protecting
federalism.
Others may be more explicit. For example, also in the In the Patriation Reference (at
848): “This being so, it is the proper function of this Court, in its role of protecting and
preserving the Canadian constitution, to declare that no such power exists.” This is a clear
statement of how the Court views its role as the guardian of the constitution.
How is it coded? The unit of measurement is the sentence, therefore coding is done on a
per sentence basis. Each unit can have multiple outcomes: it can remain uncoded (if it
does not represent one of the four themes; it can be coded with any single theme; it can
be coded with multiple themes).

Thematic

Description

Example
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Role
Inter-

The Supreme Court defers

Again, there is no delegation of

Institutional

to the executive in

administrative power by Parliament; if

law/policymaking matters

anything, there is delegation by the
Government of Ontario to the federal
authorities. (Re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976])

Public Will

The Supreme Court sees its

This metaphor has endured as the

role as limiting the authority

preferred approach in constitutional

of the executive to act

interpretation, ensuring "that

unilaterally, instead

Confederation can be adapted to new

promoting some conception

social realities" (Re Securities Act, [2011])

of what the public desires
Guardian of

The Supreme Court sees its

If the power asserted is not found in the

the

role as the protector of

Constitution, it cannot be given by

Constitution

constitutional architecture

agreement. (Re Agricultural Products
Marketing Act, [1978 at 1232)

Umpire of

The Supreme Court sees its

However, the proposed Act reaches

Federalism

role as one of an arbiter of

beyond such matters and descends into the

intergovernmental relations

detailed regulation of all aspects of trading
in securities, a matter that has long been
viewed as provincial. (Re Securities Act,
[2011])

Coding is performed manually by the researcher. Each reference is read in detail for the
narrative elements described above. When an element is present (in the judgment of the
coder), the sentence is tagged according to the appropriate theme. Once coding was
complete, all coded segments were exported from QDA Miner and checked for validity.
Coded segments were checked first by case to remove any false/erroneous codes, and
then checked again by theme to ensure internal consistency.
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A Note About Wording
It is not the case that all sentences containing the word “federalism” will be coded as
“federalism”. Likewise, it’s not necessary that a sentence possess the work “federalism”
to be coded as such. Coding cannot be too dependent on specific words (i.e. we cannot
assume semantic independence and therefore automatically code specific words) as the
Court often uses language that implies the opposite of a code: “Its function is to limit the
Governor in Council’s otherwise broad discretion to appoint judges”. Coding this as
“inter-institutional” would mistakenly apply a code to a sentence that conveys the
opposite meaning.
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